

By Mr. FITZGERALD of Massachusetts: Resolutions of the sixth annual convention of the Ohio Valley Improvement Association, for the improvement of the Ohio River by the erection of locks and dams at various points—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

Also, resolutions of Kearsarge Association, Naval Veterans, of Boston, Mass., for the passage of Senate bill No. 3423, an act to equalize the rank and pay of certain retired officers of the Navy—to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania: Paper to accompany House bill granting an increase of pension to Thomas Thompson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: Petition of county officers and citizens of Brown County, Ind., to accompany House bill granting an increase of pension to Charles H. Gott—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GROW: Petition of the Woman's Christian Association of Philadelphia, Pa., in favor of an amendment to the Constitution against polygamy—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HILL: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of John Gagen—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HITT: Resolutions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, of Poplar Grove, Ill., relative to the exclusion of alcoholic liquor from Africa and all countries inhabited chiefly by native races—to the Committee on Alcoholic Liquor Traffic.

By Mr. OTJEN: Resolution of Commandery of Wisconsin, Military Order, Loyal Legion, in support of bill for extending the patents on their insignia, ribbon, etc.—to the Committee on Patents.

By Mr. PAYNE: Petition of citizens of Auburn, N. Y., in favor of the anti-polygamy amendment to the Constitution and certain other measures—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Sherwood, N. Y., urging the passage of House bill for the protection of native races in our islands against intoxicants and opium—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. PEREA: Two petitions of citizens of Otero and Lincoln counties, N. Mex., for the protection of the forests and water supply in their vicinity—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. RICHARDSON of Alabama: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Sandy Crawford, Florence, Ala.—to the Committee on Claims.

Also, papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Mrs. W. M. Weaver—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. RIPLEY: Papers to accompany House bill No. 11755, granting a pension to Antionette A. Ripley—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ROBERTSON of Louisiana: Paper to accompany House bill granting an increase of pension to Joseph Carey—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RUSSELL: Petition of Young People's Union of the Central Baptist Church of Norwich, Conn., urging the passage of House bill No. 12551, for the protection of native races in our islands against intoxicants and opium—to the Committee on Alcoholic Liquor Traffic.

By Mr. STEELE: Petition of David Allen and 19 other citizens of Wabash, Ind., favoring uniform marriage and divorce laws and certain other measures—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SULZER: Resolutions of the New York Academy of Medicine for the repeal of the war tax on charitable, educational, and religious institutions—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, resolutions of the New York Academy of Medicine for an appropriation for six iron bookshelves in the Surgeon-General's Office, Washington, D. C.—to the Committee on Appropriations.

Also, paper to accompany House bill to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of John Skillicorn—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SUTHERLAND: Papers to accompany Senate bill No. 3349—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. VREELAND: Petition of Women's Missionary Society of the Presbyterian Church of Fredonia, N. Y., favoring anti-polygamy amendment to the Constitution—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of citizens of Friendship, N. Y., against the establishment of the parcels-post system—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. WEEKS: Petition of keeper and surfmen of Grindstone City, Mich., life-saving station, for the passage of the bill to increase their pay—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of A. N. Carlisle and others of Port Huron, Mich., in favor of the letter carriers' salary bill—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. YOUNG: Petition of James G. Biddle, of Philadelphia, Pa., favoring the passage of House bill No. 11350, to establish the national standardizing bureau—to the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures.

## SENATE.

TUESDAY, January 15, 1901.

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. W. H. MILBURN, D. D.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. CARTER, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Journal will stand approved.

## LEGATION BUILDING AT SEOUL.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of State, transmitting a copy of a dispatch from the minister of the United States to Korea, explaining the necessity for the improvement of the legation building owned by the United States at Seoul, and asking that an appropriation of \$2,250 be made for that purpose; which, with the accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

## ELECTORAL VOTE OF WYOMING.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of State, transmitting a certified copy of the final ascertainment of the electors for President and Vice-President appointed in the State of Wyoming at the election held therein on the 6th day of November, 1900; which, with the accompanying paper, was ordered to lie on the table.

## CLAIMS OF NEW YORK INDIANS.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, in response to a resolution of the 3d instant, a report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, relative to the sums of money, if any, paid by the United States upon the claim of the New York Indians for compensation for lands in Kansas growing out of the treaty concluded at Buffalo Creek on January 15, 1838, or subsequent treaties, etc.; which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

## PAYMENTS TO SISSETON AND WAHPETON INDIANS.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, in response to a resolution of the 7th instant, copies of all recommendations, requests, and papers on file in relation to the payment of money belonging to the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians to said Indians since November 6, 1900, etc.; which, on motion of Mr. PETTIGREW, was, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

## REPORTS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Mr. LODGE. I ask that the vote by which the Senate passed resolution No. 456 may be reconsidered. I will then ask that the resolution may be amended so as to conform to the law and save the necessity of a separate appropriation. It is the resolution for printing the Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts asks that the vote by which the resolution indicated by him was passed be reconsidered. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is reconsidered.

Mr. LODGE. I now ask for the consideration of the resolution with a view to its amendment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution, without objection, is before the Senate.

Mr. LODGE. I propose the amendments which I send to the desk.

The SECRETARY. In line 1 strike out the word "of" and insert the words "as a Senate document;" and in line 9, after the word "purposes," strike out "500 copies, of which number 35 copies shall be for the use of the Senate;" so that when amended the resolution will read as follows:

*Resolved*, That there be printed as a Senate document the Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate from 1789 to 1900, prepared under the direction of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as authorized by the act approved June 6, 1900, entitled "An act making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, and for prior years, and for other purposes."

The amendments were agreed to.

The resolution as amended was agreed to.

## ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. W. J. BROWNING, its Chief Clerk, announced that the Speaker of the House had signed the following enrolled bills and joint resolution; and they were thereupon signed by the President pro tempore:

A bill (S. 5231) relating to the accounts of United States marshals and clerks of the district courts of the Territory of Utah;

A bill (H. R. 827) for the relief of the trustees of the Presbyterian Church of Dardanelle, Yell County, Ark.;

A bill (H. R. 3020) for the relief of Rev. William T. McElroy;

A bill (H. R. 3047) to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of John Faulds, Company G, Thirty-first Wisconsin Infantry;

A bill (H. R. 12395) to provide for the holding of the circuit and district courts of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas;

A bill (H. R. 12740) making an apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States under the Twelfth Census; and

A joint resolution (S. R. 145) authorizing the Secretary of War to grant permits to the executive committee on inaugural ceremonies for use of reservations or public spaces in the city of Washington on the occasion of the inauguration of the President-elect, on March 4, 1901, etc.

#### PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. SCOTT presented a petition of sundry citizens of Ohio County, W. Va., praying for the repeal of the revenue-stamp tax on bank checks; which was referred to the Committee on Finance.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of West Virginia, praying for the enactment of the so-called Grout bill, to regulate the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Mr. McMILLAN presented a petition of the Jewish Woman's Club of Detroit, Mich., praying for the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit polygamy; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented a petition of the Trades and Labor Union of Port Huron, Mich., praying for the enactment of legislation to regulate the hours of daily labor of workmen and mechanics, and also to protect free labor from prison competition; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor.

Mr. WETMORE presented the petitions of Asa Church, keeper, and 7 other members of the life-saving crew at Point Judith; of Albert Church, keeper, and 7 other members of the life-saving crew at Narragansett Pier; of Nathaniel D. Ball, keeper, and 7 other members of the life-saving crew at Block Island, and of W. F. Saunders, keeper, and 7 other members of the life-saving crew at Quonochontang, all in the State of Rhode Island, praying for the enactment of legislation to promote the efficiency of the Life-Saving Service and to encourage the saving of life from shipwreck; which were referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. NELSON presented a petition of sundry citizens of Odin, Minn., praying for the enactment of the so-called Grout bill, to regulate the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Owatonna, Minn., praying for the enactment of legislation to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in Army canteens; which was ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. KEAN presented sundry petitions of citizens of Plainfield, Summit, Haddonfield, and Madison, all in the State of New Jersey, praying for the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit polygamy; which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. HARRIS. I present the petition of A. N. Russell, of Cherryvale, Kans., for reference to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads. As it is very short, I ask that it may be read, so as to give the rank and file a chance to be heard.

There being no objection, the petition was read, and referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, as follows:

CHERRYVALE, KANS., January 12, 1901.

To the Senators, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

HONORABLE GENTLEMEN: People in cities have mail delivered free, yet most of them are within five minutes of the post-office, and many of them have plenty of leisure time and the trip would do them good. Many farmers now have free-mail delivery. Throughout the land there are several millions of people in very moderate circumstances to whom the saving of even \$1 per year is an important item. Why not make the boxes in the post-offices free and allow more than one family to use the same box, if they wish? Tariff bills for rich manufacturers are attended to promptly. Financial measures for rich bankers are put through, and objection or debate is not tolerated. Shipbuilding jobs are coddled with prompt manifestations of affection. Mrs. Grant was granted a pension of \$5,000 in thirty minutes. Would it be possible for the millions of people in the United States to have a free use of a box in their post-office within eleven years?

Yours, truly,

A. N. RUSSELL.

Mr. CULBERSON presented a petition of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, of Denison, Tex., praying for the enactment of legislation to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to native races in Africa; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. DANIEL presented the petition of James A. D. Savage, keeper, and seven other members of the life-saving station of Wachapreague, Va., praying for the enactment of legislation to promote the efficiency of the Life-Saving Service, and to encourage the saving of life from shipwreck; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. COCKRELL presented the affidavits of Dr. W. E. Dawson, of Eldorado Springs, Mo., and of Dr. Kimball Hill and Dr.

J. N. Haynes, of Eldorado Springs, Mo., to accompany the bill (S. 5563) granting an increase of pension to Samuel J. Boyer; which were referred to the Committee on Pensions.

Mr. TOWNE presented petitions of sundry citizens of Beaver Creek, Hugo, and of Jackson and Freeborn counties, all in the State of Minnesota, praying for the enactment of the so-called Grout bill, to regulate the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine; which were referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Mr. FRYE presented the petition of Charles C. Benson and 37 other citizens of Lewiston, Me., praying for the repeal of the revenue-stamp tax on bank checks; which was referred to the Committee on Finance.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES.

Mr. GALLINGER. I am directed by the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 10945) granting an increase of pension to William T. Wyant, to report it adversely, and to move its indefinite postponement, the beneficiary under the bill being dead.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. GALLINGER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them each with an amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 5325) granting an increase of pension to Warren Damon;

A bill (H. R. 3636) granting an increase of pension to George A. Libby; and

A bill (S. 4237) granting a pension to Frances Helen Lewis.

Mr. GALLINGER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally with amendments, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 5170) granting a pension to Louise Wolcott Knowlton Browne;

A bill (S. 5397) granting a pension to Charity McKenney; and

A bill (S. 4731) granting an increase of pension to Henrietta M. Leiper.

Mr. GALLINGER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 8942) granting an increase of pension to Michael Howlett;

A bill (S. 5505) granting a pension to Kate M. Scott;

A bill (S. 5506) granting a pension to Mary Fryer, now Gardner; and

A bill (S. 5507) granting a pension to Mary Priscilla Allen, now Barry.

Mr. GALLINGER (for Mr. KENNEY), from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 5409) granting an increase of pension to John W. Phillips, reported it with an amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

He also (for Mr. KENNEY), from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 4772) granting a pension to John W. Eichelberger, reported it with an amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

He also (for Mr. KYLE), from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally with amendments, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 4542) granting a pension to Jane Woods;

A bill (S. 3400) granting an increase of pension to Charles T. Shaw; and

A bill (S. 5146) for the relief of Robert H. Jones.

Mr. GALLINGER (for Mr. KYLE), from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 4692) granting an increase of pension to Asa W. Taylor, reported it with an amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

He also (for Mr. KYLE), from the same committee, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 7912) granting an increase of pension to Harriet A. Wilson; and

A bill (H. R. 3658) granting a pension to Catherine Broughton.

Mr. ALLEN, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them each with an amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 2104) granting an increase of pension to William L. Aten;

A bill (S. 2227) granting an increase of pension to Uriah Clark; and

A bill (H. R. 5643) granting a pension to Elizabeth Beesley.

Mr. ALLEN, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 648) granting an increase of pension to Margaret G. White, reported it with amendments, and submitted a report thereon.

He also, from the same committee, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 9785) granting a pension to Catherine A. McClanathan; and



A bill (H. R. 4536) granting an increase of pension to William P. Aylesworth.

Mr. ALLEN (for Mr. KENNEY), from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 11211) granting a pension to Thomas Clark;

A bill (H. R. 5944) granting an increase of pension to Jeremiah Everly;

A bill (H. R. 4130) granting a pension to Mary Clark;

A bill (H. R. 8273) granting a pension to Sarah S. Hammond;

A bill (H. R. 9981) granting an increase of pension to Joseph Zimmerman;

A bill (H. R. 10639) granting an increase of pension to Julia A. Gilpin;

A bill (H. R. 8191) granting an increase of pension to Adam Bieger; and

A bill (H. R. 4143) granting a pension to Laura V. Swearer.

Mr. HARRIS, from the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment, to whom was referred the bill (S. 5417) to amend section 1754 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to the preference in civil appointments of ex-Army and Navy officers, reported it without amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

Mr. TURNER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 4828) granting an increase of pension to Norman Stewart, reported it with amendments, and submitted a report thereon.

Mr. PRITCHARD, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them each with an amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 3531) granting a pension to William P. Payne; and

A bill (S. 5400) granting a pension to Martin Dismukes.

Mr. PRITCHARD, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 8027) granting a pension to William R. Miller;

A bill (H. R. 9378) granting a pension to Irving Johnson; and

A bill (H. R. 2636) granting an increase of pension to John H. Gardner.

Mr. QUARLES, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 10892) granting an increase of pension to Phebe Tate;

A bill (H. R. 4231) granting a pension to Michael Ryan, alias Kennedy;

A bill (H. R. 4516) granting an increase of pension to Burwell Hinchman; and

A bill (H. R. 6623) granting a pension to Sarah E. Wall.

HORATIO N. DAVIS.

Mr. GALLINGER. I am directed by the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (S. 5549) granting an increase of pension to Horatio N. Davis, to report it favorably without amendment. The beneficiary is the father of the late Senator Davis, and I call the attention of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. NELSON] to this report.

Mr. NELSON. I ask unanimous consent that the bill may be considered now.

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill. It proposes to place on the pension roll the name of Horatio N. Davis, late captain and commissary of subsistence, United States Volunteers, and to pay him a pension at the rate of \$50 per month in lieu of that he is now receiving.

The bill was reported to the Senate without amendment, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

#### REPORT OF LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS.

Mr. WETMORE, from the Committee on the Library, reported the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Printing:

*Resolved*, That there be printed 3,000 copies of the annual report of the Librarian of Congress, 1900, of which number 500 copies bound in cloth shall be for the use of the Senate, and for the use of the Librarian of Congress 1,500 copies in paper covers and 1,000 copies in cloth.

#### THE NICARAGUA CANAL BILL.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, I desire to ask the unanimous consent of the Senate that a vote shall be taken on House bill No. 2538, being the Nicaragua Canal bill, on the 11th day of February, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon—the bill and amendments.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alabama asks unanimous consent that votes of the Senate be taken on the bill known as the Nicaragua Canal bill and all pending amendments at 5 o'clock on the 11th day of February next. Is there objection?

Mr. DANIEL. I object.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is made.

#### DELAWARE RIVER BRIDGE.

Mr. VEST. I am directed by the Committee on Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (S. 5395) to authorize the United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company and the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, or their successors, to construct and maintain a bridge across the Delaware River, to report it favorably with amendments.

Mr. SEWELL. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be taken up and put on its passage. It is merely for the straightening of a track to avoid a curve.

The Secretary read the bill; and, by unanimous consent, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to its consideration.

The bill was reported from the Committee on Commerce with amendments.

The first amendment was, in line 3, section 3, page 3, after the word "thereon," to insert "or after completion;" so as to read:

And should any change be made in the plan of the bridge during the progress of the work thereon or after completion, such change shall be subject likewise to the approval of the Secretary of War.

The next amendment was at the end of section 3 to insert:

And the said structure shall be changed and altered at the cost and expense of the owners thereof from time to time, as the Secretary of War may direct, so as to preserve the free and convenient navigation of said river.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was to add as a new section the following:

SEC. 6. That all railroad companies desiring the use of the bridge authorized by this act shall have, and be entitled to, equal rights and privileges relative to the passage of railway trains or cars over the same and over the approaches thereto, upon the payment of a reasonable compensation for such use. And in case the owner or owners of said bridge and the several railroad companies, or any one of them desiring such use, shall fail to agree upon the sum or sums to be paid, and upon rules and conditions to which each shall conform in using said bridge, all matters at issue between them shall be decided by the Secretary of War upon a hearing of the allegations and proofs of the parties; and equal privileges in the use of said bridge shall be granted to all telegraph and telephone companies.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was to add as a new section the following:

SEC. 7. That this act shall be null and void unless the bridge herein authorized shall be commenced within one year and completed within three years from the date hereof.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was to add as a new section the following:

SEC. 8. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this act is hereby expressly reserved.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments were concurred in.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

R. W. BARBER.

Mr. COCKRELL. I move that the Committee on Pensions be discharged from the further consideration of the bill (S. 516) for the relief of R. W. Barber, and that it be indefinitely postponed. The motion was agreed to.

#### BILLS INTRODUCED.

Mr. COCKRELL introduced a bill (S. 5574) granting a pension to Robert W. Barber; which was read twice by its title.

Mr. COCKRELL. To accompany the bill I present the petition of Robert W. Barber, Company F, Fifty-sixth Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, with the affidavits of Dr. J. H. Rider, Col. Casper Uhl, and Leon J. Albert, and the military record of the claimant. I move that the bill and accompanying papers be referred to the Committee on Pensions.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. LODGE introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5575) granting an increase of pension to Charles Brown;

A bill (S. 5576) granting an increase of pension to Thomas D. Brigham; and

A bill (S. 5577) granting an increase of pension to Martha W. Pollard.

Mr. FRYE introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5578) granting a pension to Esther F. Moody (with an accompanying paper); and

A bill (S. 5579) granting an increase of pension to Robert M. Gustin.

Mr. BUTLER introduced a bill (S. 5580) providing for an additional circuit judge in the fourth judicial circuit; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. DANIEL (by request) introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Claims:

A bill (S. 5581) for the relief of Lettie Myers; and

A bill (S. 5582) for the relief of C. A. Sprinkel.

Mr. KYLE introduced a bill (S. 5583) extending the time for the commencement and completion of the bridge across the Missouri River at or near Oacoma, S. Dak.; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. TURLEY introduced a bill (S. 5584) granting increase of pension to Mary E. Pillow; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

#### AMENDMENTS TO APPROPRIATION BILLS.

Mr. LODGE submitted an amendment providing for a board of three engineers to examine and report upon the advisability of continuing the improvement of the harbor of refuge at Sandy Bay, Cape Ann, Massachusetts, and providing that if the report of the board be favorable the improvement be placed under the so-called continuing contract system, intended to be proposed by him to the river and harbor appropriation bill; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce, and ordered to be printed.

Mr. DANIEL submitted an amendment proposing to appropriate \$4,000 for grading and regulating Mossmore street from Erie street to Columbia road, in the District of Columbia, intended to be proposed by him to the District of Columbia appropriation bill; which was referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia, and ordered to be printed.

#### AGREEMENTS WITH COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA.

Mr. MORGAN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Whereas an agreement with Costa Rica and also with Nicaragua has been made with the United States in the following terms, viz:

*Protocol of an agreement between the Governments of the United States and of Costa Rica in regard to future negotiations for the construction of an interoceanic canal by way of Lake Nicaragua.*

It is agreed between the two Governments that when the President of the United States is authorized by law to acquire control of such portion of the territory now belonging to Costa Rica as may be desirable and necessary on which to construct and protect a canal of depth and capacity sufficient for the passage of vessels of the greatest tonnage and draft now in use from a point near San Juan del Norte, on the Caribbean Sea, via Lake Nicaragua, to Brito, on the Pacific Ocean, they mutually engage to enter into negotiations with each other to settle the plan and the agreements, in detail, found necessary to accomplish the construction and to provide for the ownership and control of the proposed canal.

As preliminary to such future negotiations it is forthwith agreed that the course of said canal and the terminals thereof shall be the same that were stated in a treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Great Britain on February 5, 1900, and now pending in the Senate of the United States for confirmation, and that the provisions of the same shall be adhered to by the United States and Costa Rica.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this protocol and have hereunto affixed their seals.

*Resolved*, That the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of July 4, 1850, gives no right to Great Britain to demand that the Congress of the United States shall withhold its ratification of said agreements or shall abstain from legislation to provide for their prompt execution.

2. That the ratification by Great Britain of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of February 5, 1900, as the same has been amended in the Senate, is not a condition precedent to legislation by Congress in providing for the execution of said agreements with Costa Rica and Nicaragua; nor are the principles or provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which was ratified July 4, 1850, any just or admissible ground of objection on the part of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to the enactment of a law by Congress providing for the execution of such agreements with Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

#### COURTS IN MISSOURI.

Mr. COCKRELL. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of a very short bill, the bill (H. R. 10498) to create a new division in the western judicial district of the State of Missouri. It is a local measure, reported favorably with amendments by the Committee on the Judiciary, and it will take only a moment.

The Secretary read the bill; and, by unanimous consent, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to its consideration.

The bill was reported from the Committee on the Judiciary with amendments.

The first amendment was, in section 3, on page 2, line 10, to strike out "except when court is in session and a judge present;" in line 11 to strike out "may" and insert "shall;" in line 12, after the word "kept," to strike out "as of the same court;" in line 13, after the word "performed," to strike out the words "as though the clerk were at Joplin;" and insert "except when court is in session at Joplin;" and in line 15, after the word "judge," to strike out "and the clerk," so as to make the section read:

SEC. 3. That the clerks of the district and circuit courts for the western district of Missouri, and the marshal and attorney of the United States for said district, shall perform the duties appertaining to their offices, respectively, for said courts of said southwestern division judicial district, and the clerk's office of the said courts shall be at Springfield, where all records of said courts may be kept and all duties performed, except when court is in session at Joplin; but should, in the judgment of the district judge, the business of said courts hereafter warrant a deputy clerk at Joplin, Mo., new books and records may be opened for the courts herein created, and kept at Joplin, and a deputy clerk appointed to reside and keep his office at Joplin.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 3, to strike out all of section 8, in the following words:

SEC. 8. That each of said courts shall be held in a building to be provided for that purpose by the county or municipal authorities, and without expense to the United States.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, in section 9, page 4, after the words "nineteen hundred" to insert "and one."

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. COCKRELL. The section should be renumbered, striking out "9" and inserting "8."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerks will do that.

The bill was reported to the Senate as amended and the amendments were concurred in.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

#### COURTS IN WEST VIRGINIA.

Mr. SPOONER. I ask unanimous consent—

Mr. HAWLEY. I call for the regular order.

Mr. SPOONER. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill (H. R. 953) to divide the State of West Virginia into two judicial districts.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut demands the regular order.

Mr. COCKRELL and Mr. GALLINGER. What is the regular order?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The regular order is the call for concurrent and other resolutions.

#### PETITION OF FILIPINOS.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate a resolution coming over from a previous day, which is the regular order.

The Secretary read the resolution submitted by Mr. TELLER on the 10th instant, as follows:

*Ordered*, That the petition of certain inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, which has to-day been read in the Senate, be printed as a document, together with the names of the signers.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Will the Senate agree to the resolution?

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I am opposed to the printing of this petition, and I think it ought to be understood before the resolution is further entertained. The petition, so called, is a verbose, arrogant, untruthful recital of conditions in the Philippines. It is alleged in this document that a revolution broke out in 1896 in pursuance of grievous considerations, etc., and then it carries its history right up through as a continuous revolution. It then exclaims:

Who now will dare to affirm that independence was not contemplated when the revolution broke out?

Then it goes on to state what is quite important to be now considered:

Aguinaldo, the most prominent figure in the revolution, is the idol of the people, the constant object of their blessings and affectionate regard, because he understands the aspirations of the country, he strives unceasingly for her independence, he represents her highest ideals.

It is not true that that revolution has been in progress from 1896 until the present time. On the contrary, as to the same Aguinaldo who is their ideal, whom they set up as a model, who, they state, has been unceasingly struggling for liberty, the fact is—and it is a matter of history—that prior to Dewey's entering into the Bay of Manila the revolution of 1896 was compromised for money and Aguinaldo and his associates left the country, Aguinaldo stipulating, for gold coin, not to come back there again. He was an exile when Dewey entered the Bay of Manila. So the revolution was not continuous; and he is a pretty model of continuous exertion for liberty—a man who had sold out!

It is alleged that he went back on account of some agreement with the American officers. This he denies. He adds to the denial of Admiral Dewey and of General Anderson and General Merritt his denial. In a letter of instructions signed by Mabini, the president of Aguinaldo's cabinet, to certain secret commissioners, we find this:

The chief of the Philippine people has not made any agreement with the Government of the United States, but, inspired by the same idea of destroying the sovereignty of Spain in these islands, they have mutually assisted each other.

So, with the testimony of our officers unanimous, and the testimony of Aguinaldo through his cabinet minister, the chief of the cabinet giving official instruction to the commissioners, ought to be sufficient to settle that question.

So far as the United States are concerned, there has been no duplicity; but such is not the fact with regard to Aguinaldo and his followers. They do not come with clean hands. The whole substance of their petition is false, as shown by documents on file in the War Department.

The treachery of Aguinaldo and his associates is abundantly shown by the proceedings of a meeting held in Hongkong on the 4th day of May, 1898, four days after the battle of Manila Bay. A meeting of Aguinaldo's band was held to consider as to going



to Manila with Dewey, and Agoncillo stated the position of the adventurers in these words:

There will be no better occasion than the present for the expeditionary forces to land on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans, and assure the attainment of our legitimate aspirations against those very people.

The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United States, but, provided with arms, will be able to oppose themselves to them and struggle for their independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Filipinos.

They went there and got arms for the purpose of betraying the American people. Then it is alleged that we made war on these unoffending people. The plan to attack us and make war upon the United States was most treacherously prearranged. Aguinaldo went to Manila in an American ship under false pretenses, and obtained arms from the United States under the pretense of friendship. The attack on the soldiers of the United States on the 4th of February, 1899, was not accidental, but premeditated. I will ask the Secretary to read the instructions issued by Aguinaldo himself. They are short.

The Secretary read as follows:

MALOLOS, January 9, 1899.

Instructions to the brave soldiers of Sandatahan of Manila.

ART. 2. All of the chiefs and Filipino brothers should be ready and courageous for the combat, and should take advantage of the opportunity to study well the situation of the American outposts and headquarters, observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise the enemy.

ART. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretense of looking for the same officer for some reason, and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This, wherever it is possible, at the moment of attack.

ART. 4. They should not prior to the attack look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance, in order to kill the sentinel.

ART. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Mr. STEWART. That is the way this so-called war began—first, by these Filipinos treacherously conspiring to get back there with Dewey as friends, and obtain arms, which they did, and, second, after they had obtained arms, their purpose was to use them against the United States. Before any aggression on the part of the United States had taken place deliberate orders were given to begin a treacherous attack, and to commence assassination with the arms which they had obtained from the United States.

Then, again, we find one of Aguinaldo's letters to a friend in Manila to get out of the city. His friends were all notified to look out. Here is one which I shall read:

MY DEAR DON BENITO:

I beg you to leave Manila with your family, and to come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you. I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.

Mr. SPOONER. When was that?

Mr. STEWART. The date of that letter is early in January, about a month before the attack. The attack was made on the 4th of February.

These people, who are represented as struggling for liberty, have deliberately betrayed the United States in every respect. The man who is their ideal sold out the rebellion against Spain for money, and left the country, agreeing not to return. In violation of that agreement, he obtained passage on an American ship, and obtained arms from American officers under the false pretense that he was their friend, while he was plotting and making arrangements during the whole time to make war against the United States.

This is not a petition. This is an arrogant defiance. They say they will have nothing short of independence; they will not tolerate the sovereignty of the United States at all, and that, even if they are subdued and compelled to submit, they will rise again at the first opportunity. Every possible threat which could be made against the Government of the United States is contained in this petition. If ever there was any argument needed in favor of the passage of this bill or any other bill the President may require to put down this armed rebellion, that petition and that defiance furnish the strongest argument, it seems to me.

The Army bill should pass, and pass speedily. Those who have betrayed our confidence, they have plotted the assassination of all of our people in those islands; they have carried on this guerrilla and bloody warfare in which so many of our soldiers have perished, and now can we as Americans afford to stand here and let them defy us, and say we will not stand by the Government? Meet that defiance and maintain the honor of the country.

It seems to me that the people of the United States have already settled the question. These matters were before them. They have demanded that the President should be sustained with whatever army is necessary to put down the rebellion, and even on the stump it has been necessary for the opponents of the Administration to say they were in favor of it also. They were first in favor of proceeding to establish order, but order can only be established by force. How can we dare to trust the honor of the Government, which is pledged by treaty to protect life and property in those islands—how can we dare to trust the lives of the friendly Filipinos and the lives of our citizens who may be there—to these people who demand independence, this treacherous class of acknowledged assassins who plot—and we have it on record here—how can we dare, I say, to hesitate to put down this rebellion and vindicate the honor of the country?

I think this petition ought not to receive any recognition. It does not come from citizens of the United States; it comes from rebels in arms, who declare that they never were and never will be citizens of the United States, and that if they are compelled to submit they will rise again; that they will, by assassination and treachery, or anything they can do, overthrow the authority of the United States; and now they come here to petition the United States authority which they despise, asking what? Asking us for immediate independence on account of their patriotism, which patriotism is false. The statements in regard to their patriotism are false from beginning to end. Their patriotism is a rebellion against all authority; their patriotism is treachery; their patriotism is a violation of faith, a violation of plighted honor, and they ask the Senate of the United States to surrender. This is simply a demand to surrender, though it is called a petition. That is all it is.

It comes from a people who are the most wicked conspirators of whom we have any knowledge, the most treacherous, by the record of their own proceedings, which comes from them, and they still deny the authority of the United States. Will the Senate submit to that, and decline to pass the Army bill? Will it yield to them? Such a surrender will not be indorsed by the people of the United States. The Army bill ought to be passed speedily. After this petition becomes generally circulated, there will be a universal demand on the part of the people of the United States that this rebellion shall be put down, that these traitors shall be subdued, and that the authority of the Government of the United States shall be maintained.

Mr. BERRY. Mr. President, I listened the other morning to the reading of the petition which it is proposed to print as a document for the use of the Senate. It seemed to me from the reading that it was couched in respectful language, that it was splendidly written, and that it represented the hopes and aspirations of the great body of the people of those islands. As I remember, it was said to be signed by numbers who were not in rebellion against the authority of the United States, even as defined by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART].

Mr. TELLER. None of the signers are in rebellion.

Mr. BERRY. None of them are in rebellion; but they are citizens who have submitted for the time being to the authority of the United States. They presented their case in a respectful way, and it is asked by a Senator that it be printed.

If the petition be untrue, then, Mr. President, it will have no great effect throughout the United States; but if you undertake to suppress it and keep it away from the people, you will make thousands of them believe that every word of that petition is true. I think you can not help the cause of the Filipinos better than for the Senate of the United States to show by its action that it is afraid to print a petition respectfully presented by so many people of those islands.

Mr. President, while I am on the floor, as I had intended to make a few remarks upon the amendment to the Army bill that is now pending, offered by myself upon yesterday, which represents my views of what the Senate should do, I will ask the Secretary to read the amendment I propose to offer, and I will make the remarks now which I intend to make on that amendment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will state the amendment proposed by the Senator from Arkansas.

The SECRETARY. It is proposed to insert at the end of the last section of the bill the following:

SEC. —. That within ten days after this bill shall become a law the President of the United States shall issue his proclamation declaring that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the Philippine Islands except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the islands to its people.

Mr. BERRY. Mr. President, that is the exact language which was contained in the resolution adopted by the Senate in regard to Cuba at the time the declaration of war was made. I confess that in presenting this amendment I have little hope that Senators who support the Administration will cast their votes for it, but I want to state that this amendment is offered in the utmost good faith, because I believe that if the Congress of the United States



would adopt that language as an amendment to this bill, within two months there would not be a single armed Filipino in rebellion against the Government of the United States. I believe that if that amendment was adopted we could reduce our Army to the minimum named in this bill, and that within three months there would be no necessity for even 50,000 soldiers. I believe that if we should adopt that amendment we would place the United States upon the highest plane of justice, humanity, moderation, and magnanimity, that we would place this Government where it was prior to the time when the mistake was made of inaugurating this war upon the Philippine people. There never has been a day since the close of the Spanish war when, if it had been announced by the President that he would recommend that course to Congress, the war would not have come to an end and a gun would never have been thereafter fired.

I am going to detain the Senate but a short time, but I want to state facts that are not denied and can not be. It has been frequently alleged during this session of Congress by Senators on the other side of the Chamber, and it was alleged on every stump and from every rostrum throughout the United States in the late contest, that the President of the United States, that the Administration was in no wise responsible for the war in the Philippines; that the President could have done nothing except what he did, and that the responsibility was on Congress if it was anywhere.

Mr. President, I think the statement is not borne out by the facts. On the 12th day of August, I think it was, the protocol was signed. There never has been a time in the history of this Government when the United States commanded so much of the respect of all the civilized peoples of the world; there has never been a time when it commanded so much of the love and affection of every citizen within the United States as it did on that day. We had engaged in war for the highest and loftiest purpose; we had gone to war pledging our sacred honor that it was not for conquest, but to make the people of Cuba free, as we ourselves are free. We had the most wonderful success and gained the greatest victories ever gained in the history of the world. Our people were proud—proud that we had made these sacrifices with the highest and purest motives, proud that it could not be charged that we made war on a weaker nation in order to gain territory or money; and from one end of this country to the other, from the North and the South, the East and the West, everywhere throughout the land, the United States had the affectionate love, the confidence, and the respect of every citizen in it. Such was the condition on the 12th day of August. What followed that, Mr. President?

Let us see whether or not this war could have been avoided. At the time the Paris Peace Commission was appointed no one ever thought or dreamed or spoke of holding any territory permanently, save and except the island of Porto Rico. There had been talk about a naval station or a coaling station in Manila, but no man at that time ever contemplated that it was the intention or the purpose of the United States to keep those islands permanently; but by and by that element of American politics which have recently become so powerful, who claim to especially represent commercial interests—the great combinations of wealth, many of whom place money above truth, justice, honor, and fair dealing—began to start the cry that if we could hold the Philippine Islands we could open up the markets of Asia; that it would increase our trade, and would add largely to our wealth. They began also to say that Porto Rico would not reimburse the United States for the money we had expended in the Spanish war, and therefore we must take the Philippine Islands.

I will do the President the justice to say that at first he resisted the demand; I will do him the justice to say that he did not desire to do what he has since done; but as time went on, we have the statement on the authority of the Senator from Maine [Mr. FRYE], who made it in open session here, that that commission was first instructed not to take any of the islands except the island of Luzon; but afterwards, as I said, this element in our politics brought their influence to bear upon the Administration, and, in an evil hour for this country, the President yielded to that influence and instructed his commissioners to take all of the islands. That is the history of the transaction.

It is said that the President is not responsible. Does any man suppose that his agents, the men he sent there, would have taken a single step of which they did not inform him and which did not meet his approval?

The next demand was that we should take the entire archipelago, and we paid \$20,000,000 for it. The people of the Philippine Islands were, at the beginning of the Spanish war, in the same situation as the Cubans. They had been held in bondage by Spain; they had suffered the same outrages and the same oppression for hundreds of years.

They, like the Cubans, had again and again made a struggle for freedom, which was overcome and subdued, or there had been compromises on condition of rights being granted, and they yielded; but when they heard that the greatest Government in

the world, a Government founded upon the principle that every people have the right to be free, was engaged in a war with their oppressor, with their master, with that country which they had hated for so many years, and that this great Government was going into that war for freedom and not for conquest, in order to make them a free and independent people, the Filipinos naturally believed that they in that struggle would have the same rights as the Cubans.

Can any Senator tell me to-day why they should not have? Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, General King, and every man who testified before the Paris Commission said that the Filipinos were more intelligent, better organized, and more competent to be a free and independent people than were the Cubans. If they were, if we were willing to give our money and the blood of our citizens to make the Cubans free, can any man tell me why we should not have given the Filipinos freedom when it cost us neither money nor blood to do so? It is a question which has never been answered.

If we were justified in going to war to free the Cubans, how can we justify ourselves in refusing, when it is in our power, to free the Filipinos? They hoped for it; they believed that they would have the same freedom in the same way as the Cubans, and they had a right to believe so. But if there was a lingering doubt amongst any one of the Filipinos, that doubt was removed when Admiral Dewey sent for Aguinaldo and the leaders, put them upon one of our Government ships, furnished them arms, and made them our allies in the fight; and so animated by hope were those people that within a very short period of time they had organized an army of 50,000 men, with the hope of liberty so long withheld and so strenuously fought for by them. They believed, as all brave people believe, that they were entitled to be free and that their aspirations were about to be accomplished; and so they drove the Spaniards from every foot of soil in the Philippines, save and except Manila.

But when the Paris commission met, when it began to be whispered abroad that the people of the United States were not going to deal with them as they dealt with Cuba, they naturally became anxious, they became suspicious, they became doubtful. They sought in every way to ascertain the purpose of the United States.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. HOAR] read here the other day the statement of a general officer, I think it was, who testified that he promised Aguinaldo, in the presence of Admiral Dewey, that they should have an independent government. So when it began to dawn upon them that there was doubt about it, that the freedom for which they had so long struggled was to be taken away when they thought it was already in their grasp, it was natural that they should want to ascertain the truth about it, that they should become suspicious as to whether or not it was simply a change of masters for them.

So they sent a man to this city. He was refused admittance into the White House. He was refused admittance into the office of the Secretary of State. He came to state his case. They refused to hear him, as the Senator from Nevada would refuse to hear the petition of these people now. They not only did not hear him, but later on, when the newspapers threatened that he would be court-martialed and shot, he absolutely fled the country in fear of his life. That is the history of it. He came here, and the President did not receive him. If I misstate the fact, and the Senator will say it is not true, I will correct it.

What followed then? In this strained condition and strained relation, when they found that these men had made the treaty of Paris, while hostilities did not begin, yet, as I said, they were anxious to know, and after the treaty was made in Paris, but before it was ratified by the Senate, the President of the United States undertook to answer that demand. He thereupon issued a proclamation dated sometime in December, I think the 28th, but I am not sure, in which he asserted sovereignty of the United States over these islands and used such language that General Otis said if it went to the Filipinos in that condition it would produce a revolt, and he took the responsibility of striking out part of the President's proclamation.

Now, as to the responsibility. I assert here to-day, and I believe that intelligent men everywhere so believe, that if the President had put three lines into that December proclamation, in which he had said, "I shall recommend to the Congress of the United States that you be treated in the same way that we promised to treat the Cubans," no gun would ever have been fired, and all the murders and the burnings, the deaths that have come to that people and to our people, would have been avoided. There was the turning point as to whether we should have peace or war. There was the President of a Christian nation called upon to speak a word one way or the other. If he asserted absolute authority, it meant war. If he asserted that we believe in independence and that they should be treated in the same way that we treated another people less competent for self-government, then it meant peace; and as I said before, while the President did not want to do it, I will do him the justice to say that what he did he did most



reluctantly, but the element that pulled him was too strong for him to resist, and unfortunately he did do it.

Now, what has been the result? We were told two years ago just about this time by Senators on the other side of this Chamber, by a few of them publicly and by many of them otherwise, that when the treaty was ratified, we would declare that it was our purpose thereafter to make those people free and independent. We were told also that when the treaty was ratified peace would come. We were told, and told in the Committee on Appropriations, if I am not mistaken, that 10,000 soldiers would be ample for the Philippine Islands; and yet to-day, almost two years after the ratification of the treaty, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SEWELL] tells us that he can not see the end of the war, and that these soldiers may be needed for a longer period than he is willing to name. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] tells us that within five years he thinks the number may be reduced to fifteen or twenty thousand, but he would not pledge his word for that.

Here to-day, in the face of all you promised, and in the face of all that we predicted, you have come and asked for a permanent army of a hundred thousand men to levy upon this people the burdens that come from a great standing army. "Oh, but if you make this promise of free government," the Senator says, "it will be taken as an act of cowardice." Mr. President, I believe that the United States is big enough and strong enough and broad enough to treat with contempt and to despise any insinuation that we could be affected by an act of cowardice anywhere. The whole world knows that we can exterminate the Filipino people. There is not a doubt in an intelligent mind anywhere as to that. No outside nation is pretending that it may interfere. Then why, through the fear that some one may say that we have conceded something by making this promise for the future, should we hesitate when we know that we could not be moved or be actuated by fear.

Mr. President, I have in what I have said to-day no political purpose, but I believe it to be the solemn duty of every man who sits on this floor to raise his voice and cast his vote against bloodshed and war where peace can be secured in honor.

No man in the United States would go further if I thought the honor of this Government was involved, but what honor can come from pursuing a helpless people, men who at least aided us in the war with Spain, who had never harmed us. Yet for fear that some one may say that we are moved by fear of those people, who are already helpless, shall we permit the pursuit to go on; shall we continue to hunt down that helpless people; shall we continue to send our young men there to fall by the bullets of those we are seeking to conquer, or to die in the malarial swamps of that far-off country?

We are told that it is too late. We are told that when the treaty was ratified that ended it. I repeat that those who favored the treaty stated then that it would be left to the Congress. I did not vote to ratify the treaty, and upon one occasion I said that I did not believe you intended to make this people free. Therefore I opposed the treaty in every way it was possible. Yet they tell us it is too late. Mr. President, it may be too late to recall the sorrow and the suffering and the murders and the burnings and the infinite horrors that have transpired in those far-off islands. It may be too late to call back the young men who went forth from our land to fight that battle, and who lost their lives either in battle or in the swamps. It may be too late for that, but it is not too late, I insist, to save further bloodshed and further horror.

It is not too late to bring this great Government of ours back to the high pinnacle upon which it stood in the past. It is not too late to say we yet believe that all people have a right to be independent and free and to govern themselves. It is not too late to disentangle ourselves from alliances that will bring wars, perhaps for fifty years to come; and, so far as I am concerned, I would gladly vote for any promise consistent with honor that would bring peace and bring our soldiers home. This is not only consistent with it, but it is absolutely in line with what we promised the Cubans. It is absolutely in line with what the Filipino people believed and had a right to believe we had promised them.

I therefore appeal to the American Senate, let us make at least one effort to stop the horrors of this unjust war and to remove the stain, as I believe, that has been placed upon the fair name of this Republic.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, the body of the petition, which does not seem to me to be of very great importance, and I do not think it adds materially to the sum of misinformation in regard to the Philippines, although it may, has been printed in full in the RECORD, and such portions of it as the newspaper press has thought desirable to print has been printed by the newspapers. It can not get any additional publicity by being printed as a Senate document. The question really is whether we want to print the 2,000 names. Those are a good many names, although they are an inconsiderable fraction of the population of Manila, which is something like 400,000; but the printing of names is very unusual. We occasionally print a few names by special permis-

sion of the Senate, but to print a large body of names, which is all that this resolution calls for, is an unusual thing, and ought to be submitted to the proper committee. I do not know whether these names are important or not. We have no statement in regard to it except from those who brought it here. I think it would be well to have the committee look into it and see whether it is desirable to depart from our usual practice in that respect. I therefore move that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Printing.

Mr. TELLER. I do not desire to discuss the resolution at the present time, but I object to its going to the Committee on Printing. If the Senator will move to refer the resolution to the committee of which he is chairman, I will not object.

Mr. LODGE. Very well, Mr. President. I withdraw the motion I have made, and move that it be referred to the Committee on the Philippines.

Mr. TELLER. I desire to add to what I have just said that I shall expect a report from that committee on the propriety or impropriety of printing this document, and if I do not get it, I shall know how to get this question again before the Senate. Now I am willing to have it referred.

Mr. HAWLEY. I understood the Senator from Colorado virtually to consent that this subject might go over until the Army bill should be disposed of.

Mr. LODGE. Let the resolution be referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CARTER in the chair). Without objection, the resolution will be referred to the Committee on the Philippines.

Mr. HAWLEY. To what committee?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Committee on the Philippines.

Mr. LODGE. That is where the petition went.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears none, and the resolution will be so referred.

#### THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

Mr. HAWLEY. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the Army bill.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 4300) to increase the efficiency of the military establishment of the United States.

Mr. PETTUS. Mr. President, yesterday evening, in a hot debate which took place about the close of the Senate's proceedings, the Senator from Montana [Mr. CARTER] stated, in reference to the measure now under consideration:

It is reported here by the unanimous report of a committee composed of members of both political parties.

There is only one part of the statement to which I desire to call the attention of the Senate, and that is the word "unanimous." The Senator from Montana was utterly mistaken in that proposition. I suppose it arose from the fact that when the occurrence took place he may have been absent from the committee, but all the other members of the committee, I am sure, will know that it was not reported by the unanimous consent or the approval of all the members of the committee, because there were several members of the committee who gave notice to the committee, when the committee was in session, that they would not support the measure, but would vote against it.

I do not desire to discuss this question now at all, Mr. President. I have not engaged in the discussion at all and I do not desire to do so now, except to say that a large standing army in a republic is the greatest threat to the liberties of the people of that republic that can be made by mortal man.

Mr. BATE. Mr. President, I desire to join in the statement made by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. PETTUS] in regard to how the committee stood on this question. I will not give any particulars except to correct the statement made by the Senator from Montana. I have heretofore twice during the running debate stated how I stood on this question. The present occupant of the chair was mistaken yesterday evening in his statement in regard to myself, at least, and some of the other members of the committee. I was opposed to the bill, and I wish to let it be known that I was, and I know of some others who were. They can speak for themselves in regard to it. I wish it to appear upon the RECORD that I occupied that attitude with respect to the bill.

Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Montana will make the correction in the RECORD, because it was certainly distinctly and clearly understood that there were four members of the Committee on Military Affairs who would not vote for the bill. I know for one that I stated to the committee distinctly time and again that I would not vote for the bill on its final passage; that I would do all I could to perfect the bill from the standpoint of the majority view of it, that is, a hundred thousand men, and I labored in committee with that view in end. I say now that from the standpoint of a hundred thousand men I think the bill was in as good shape as it was possible for the committee to get it. I stated that in the committee and I state that to the Senate now.

I do not want to consume any time in the discussion of this question. I have tried to avoid it. I regret that the Senator from Montana made the statement he did, because it does us great injustice and places us in a false position. I intend to vote against the bill. I have said that openly. I have said it in committee. I have said it elsewhere. I desire to say further, as I said a moment ago, that from the standpoint of the majority, I think the bill was in as good shape as it was possible to make it. I think too much time has been taken up in the discussion of questions which related purely and essentially to individuals. I opposed them when some of them were added by the committee. I think a great deal of unnecessary time has been taken up. I believe it is the duty of Congress to pass this bill as speedily as it can, after proper discussion, because we are under obligations to our volunteer soldiers there to muster them out on the 1st of July, 1901, and there is not sufficient time now to get those soldiers home with the transports we have and get them discharged before that day arrives. As a matter of course the Government may hire at an enormous expense additional transports and get the soldiers home in that way, but with the transportation facilities that we have it will be difficult, if not almost impossible, for them all to be brought home and discharged by that time.

I do not believe in the principle of this bill at all. I do not believe in a large standing army. I am not going to enter into the discussion of that question, and I hope this will not be considered a challenge to discussion. I believe the war in the Philippines is absolutely unnecessary; that it could have been avoided in toto from beginning to end; that very great blunders were made in the protocol of August 12, 1898; in the instruction of the President of October 28, 1898, to his peace commissioners to demand of the Spanish the cession of the imaginary sovereignty of the Philippine Islands; in the treaty of peace that was made by the President, in which Spain was made, helpless and powerless as she was, to cede the imaginary sovereignty and jurisdiction of those islands.

A great mistake was made in the order of the President of December 21, 1898, commanding General Otis to extend the military authority existing in Manila, its bay and harbor, to the actual occupation of all the islands as speedily as possible. That was the order to which the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. BERRY] referred, which General Otis refused to issue, frequently referred to as the "benevolent-assimilation order." General Otis refused to issue that order. It was the first time, I believe, in the history of this country when a commanding general refused to issue the order of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. General Otis issued his own order, and in that order of General Otis he copied only the benevolent-assimilation paragraph of the President's proclamation, and went on and told the Filipinos what he believed.

I believe the whole matter could have been settled easily and without the shedding of blood or the expenditure of millions of money. I believe that when Congress declared that the government of the island of Cuba should be left to the people we thereby declared a principle to govern, to guide the President; and on the 12th day of August, 1898, I believe the conditions existing in the Philippine Islands were ten times more favorable for the independence and success of the Filipinos in establishing an independent government than ever the condition had been in Cuba. I believe that the President knew this, and that therefore he made a great mistake when he did not say to Spain, "Relinquish your authority in Cuba, relinquish your authority in the Philippine Islands, cede to us Porto Rico, and the war is over." That would have been the end of the war, for Spain lay at our feet as helpless as an infant in its mother's arms, and she would have been compelled to accept whatever the President offered.

Mr. President, I am not going to enter into the discussion of this matter. I am simply giving my views and stating why I shall vote against the bill. I do not care to discuss it any further.

Mr. SEWELL obtained the floor.

Mr. CARTER. Will the Senator from New Jersey permit me?

Mr. SEWELL. Certainly.

Mr. CARTER. The Senator from Missouri and his colleagues will observe that the discussion yesterday afternoon related to the Army reorganization. I said at that time, in reference to this bill, what follows:

It is the best effort that could be made upon a scientific basis to present a bill for the reorganization of the Army of the United States.

I presume it is not in order to state what occurred in the committee, and I shall not pretend to state it, except to the extent that the statement may be necessary in order to set Senators aright in reference to any implication to be drawn from the word "unanimous." There was not, as far as I could perceive, at any time any disposition to delay the consideration of this bill in the committee. There was a helpful spirit of cooperation extending throughout the entire period of the laborious work of the committee on the bill. In so far as the bill relates to Army organization, I think it presented the best thought of the committee without any reference whatever to partisanship. It is true that in so

far as the organization goes there was no division in the committee. Certain Senators, however, did reserve the right to vote against the bill, it being clearly and distinctly stated that those Senators took exception to the size of the Army, but not to the scheme of organization. From that point of view, the word "unanimous" ought not to be used. It should be modified to conform to the fact.

No minority report was presented, nor was there any opposition to the reporting of the bill nor any opposition to its rapid consideration. There was an agreement upon the scheme of organization and the reservation in the committee by the Senators who have so stated this morning and by others, I believe, of the right to vote against the size of the Army. I cheerfully make this statement.

Mr. PETTUS. I desire to call the attention of the Senator from Montana, before he takes his seat, to the fact that members of the committee, in committee, gave notice that they would vote against the bill.

Mr. CARTER. I have so stated.

Mr. BATE. Not stating why.

Mr. CARTER. I wish to be understood as stating that. I have stated that in committee members of the committee reserved the right to vote against the bill.

Mr. BATE. I think the Senator must be mistaken a little, because some of us, I know, reserved the right to vote against the bill without giving any special reason, except broadly. It was not stated whether it was because we were against the organization or the scheme or anything else, but because of general objection to the bill. Two or three of us did that.

Mr. SEWELL. Mr. President, I was very glad to hear the statement of the Senator from Missouri with respect to his position, which was as I understood it. He took a laborious part in the framing of this bill. He did everything he could to make it conform to the usages and arts of war and the regulations. But I understood at all times that he would vote against the bill when it was perfected. The bill was framed not on the basis of an army of a hundred thousand men. It was framed on the basis of a permanent army of fifty or sixty thousand men, with a flexible authority in the President to increase or decrease it above or below that number.

It was argued on the floor that it was a bad precedent to give the President authority in matters of this kind. I wish to bring to the attention of the Senate what appeared in the RECORD of a few days ago when the bill was under consideration in the House. I refer to the authorities for such action.

The President of the United States was authorized, "in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion of their territory by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of such invasion, discovered, in his opinion, to exist, before the next session of Congress, to cause to be enlisted and called into service a number of troops not exceeding 10,000," etc.

On July 16 of that year, 1798—there was no war then—the President was given a discretionary authority "to raise, in addition to the present military establishment, 12 regiments of infantry and 6 troops of light dragoons, to be enlisted for and during the continuance of the existing differences between the United States and the French Republic, unless sooner discharged."

In March, 1799, it was declared lawful for the President of the United States, among other things, "in case imminent danger of the invasion of their territory by any power shall, in his opinion, be discovered to exist," to organize 24 regiments of infantry, besides riflemen, artillerymen, and cavalry; and he was allowed, when it appeared expedient, during the session of the Senate or in their recess, to appoint their officers.

Again, in the year 1800, May 14, when we were not at war, the President was authorized to suspend further military appointments.

Again, March 16, 1802, he was authorized, when he should deem it expedient, to organize a corps of engineers.

Again, in 1803, March 3, he was authorized, whenever he should judge it expedient, to require the executives of such of the States as he might deem expedient, and from their local situation most convenient, to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, a detachment of militia not exceeding 80,000 men, officers included.

Again, January 2, 1812, he was authorized, when he should have satisfactory evidence of actual or threatened invasion of any State by any tribe or tribes of Indians, to raise, either by the acceptance of volunteers or by enlistment for one year, as many companies as he might deem necessary, not exceeding six, as rangers.

Again, January 29, 1813, it was provided by Congress that there should be raised such number of regiments of infantry, not exceeding twenty, as, in the opinion of the President, may be necessary for the public service, to be enlisted for one year, unless sooner discharged.

Again, in 1833, June 15, the President was authorized to raise,



by the acceptance of volunteers or by enlistment for one year, 600 mounted rangers, as the nature of the service may, in his opinion, make necessary.

Again, May 23, 1836, he was authorized to accept volunteers, either infantry or cavalry, not exceeding 10,000 men, to serve six or twelve months after they arrived at the rendezvous.

Again, May 13, 1846, there was the following enactment by Congress:

That the President of the United States be, and is hereby, authorized by voluntary enlistment to increase the number of privates in each and any of the companies of the existing regiments of dragoons, artillery, and infantry to any number not exceeding 100, whenever in his opinion the exigencies of the public service may require the same; and to reduce the same to 64 when the exigencies requiring the present increase shall cease: *Provided*, That said enlistment shall be for the term of five years and no longer, unless sooner disbanded by the President.

Now, Mr. President, these are precedents for the mode of organization proposed by this bill. The last one particularly is an exact precedent. It was the intention of the committee and men like myself who make some study of war that the bill proposed should be for an army of 55,000 or 60,000 men, and that that should be the Army of the future, and that pending the present emergency the President should be authorized to increase it. The organization is for that Army; the officers are for that Army; the field and staff are for that Army. The increase is simply the increase of privates from 54,000, or whatever number is fixed, up to 100,000, which makes an increase of about 40,000 men. The machinery is there, and is not too much. There are not enough staff officers nor enough officers generally for 100,000 men, but the committee concluded that we would get along with a permanent organization of from 55,000 to 60,000 men, and enlarge it by private enlistments whenever the President determined to do so during the present exigency.

I want to say that there are to-day in Manila 70,000 men, the number being about equally divided between volunteers and the Regular Army. There are in China about 1,500; in Cuba, 5,500; in Porto Rico, 800; and on home service, about 16,000. A great many of our posts and forts are denuded and abandoned. Along the coast we have to show, for an expenditure of \$84,000,000, a series of guns which are not at all taken care of at the present day, simply because the troops are not there to do it.

We passed in the act of March 2, 1899, a clause obliging the muster out of not alone the volunteers on the 30th of June, this year, but of the Regular Army down to 29,000 men. I have no doubt at all but that some kind of a bill will be passed, and this bill will probably be passed, but what I desire to impress on this body is the necessity for doing it now, not haggling on little private measures, as we did about the Paymaster or Commissary General yesterday.

We have discussed the question enough, I should think; particularly the preliminaries of the different organizations. The pending measure, which, I believe, is the amendment of the Senator from Georgia, is disposed of by the very precedents that I have just read, showing that there is nothing new in giving the President of the United States the authority to enlarge or decrease the number of enlisted men, or an army, if you choose, and it has never been abused, nor is it likely in this case to be abused.

Of the 70,000 men who are in the Philippines, 35,000 of them—35 volunteer regiments and more—no matter what act you pass in order to carry out the law, will have to be mustered out in this country by the 30th of June. If you went on further and required the President to muster out about 20,000 regulars there, it would make 70,000 volunteers who would have to cross the sea, going and returning, and 40,000 regulars, and it would be a physical impossibility to do it except at an enormous cost. We would have to draw on Europe for ships, at high rates, and probably would have to buy them, as we did before.

The necessities are great. There is no reason for delay that I can possibly see. The bill ought to be passed. We can not do this work—we can not recruit men and send them there to take the place of those who have got to be brought back—in less than five months. Every day is precious.

So, Mr. President, I think I am within the bounds of reason and parliamentary usage when, under the circumstances, I move to lay the pending amendment on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey moves to lay the pending amendment on the table.

Mr. BUTLER. Let it be read.

The SECRETARY. On page 17, line 12, after the word "President," insert:

During the present exigencies of the service.

So as to make the proviso read:

That the President, during the present exigencies of the service, in his discretion may increase the number of corporals in any troop of cavalry to 8 and the number of privates to 76.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey moves to lay the pending amendment on the table.

Mr. BACON. Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I gave notice

that I had not completed my remarks. I do not know whether the Senator from New Jersey knew that fact or not. If the Senator, with knowledge of that fact, now makes the motion, I shall not ask him not to make it.

Mr. SEWELL. I will say to the Senator that I had no knowledge of the fact. Several gentlemen spoke after the gentleman from Georgia yielded the floor, and I had no idea that he wanted to take the floor again.

Mr. BACON. I beg pardon, then, for the remark I made.

Mr. SEWELL. I suppose the pending is the Senator's main amendment, but he has divided it up so as to apply it to the different organizations.

Mr. BACON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SEWELL. I shall move to lay them all upon the table.

Mr. BACON. I have no objection to the motion being made at that time.

Mr. SEWELL. If the Senator desires to go on and address the Senate at present, I will cheerfully give way.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey withdraws his motion to lay the amendment on the table.

Mr. BACON. As the Senator was not aware of my purpose to address the Senate, I beg to apologize for whatever may appear to be hasty in what I said.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia will proceed.

Mr. BACON. Mr. President, the amendment as now offered by me was offered upon the statement then made that it would be acceptable to the committee, and I presumed that it would be adopted without objection.

As I stated yesterday, this amendment was not satisfactory to me, but as it went some way in the direction of the correction of the evil that I recognized in this bill, I determined to accept that much if I could not get more. But since that time the Senators who then signified their assent and the assent of the committee have stated in the Senate that they would not support this amendment. Therefore there is no inducement to me to have the amendments in this shape, and I shall withdraw these amendments and insist upon the original amendment which I offered, which was to strike out these several clauses. I ask that the amendment may be restored to the position in which I originally offered it. I trust the Senate understands why I make the change.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia withdraws the three amendments which he has offered and offers an amendment, which will be read.

Mr. BACON. It is the same that was originally offered by me, to strike out the authorization of the President to increase each one of the three branches of the service.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator desire to have the amendment read?

Mr. BACON. Possibly it may be well to have it read.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will read the amendment which the Senator from Georgia now offers and which is before the Senate.

The SECRETARY. On page 12, in section 2, beginning in line 17, strike out the following:

*Provided*, That the President, in his discretion, may increase the number of corporals in any troop of cavalry to 8, and the number of privates to 76.

On page 16, section 3, beginning in line 13, strike out the following:

*Provided*, That the President, in his discretion, may increase the number of privates in any company of foot artillery to 85, and the number of privates in any battery of field artillery to 133.

And in the same section, beginning in line 19, strike out the following:

*And provided*, That the enlisted strength of each company of foot artillery or battery of field artillery may be fixed, under the direction of the Secretary of War, according to the requirements of the service to which it may be assigned.

On page 19, section 6, beginning in line 4, strike out the following:

*Provided*, That the President, in his discretion, may increase the number of sergeants in any company of infantry to 6, the number of corporals to 10, and the number of privates to 127.

Mr. BACON. Mr. President, the three amendments which I have offered relate to the sections or clauses of the bill under which the President is authorized in his discretion to increase the Army from some fifty-odd thousand men to about 100,000 men, and it is to the general proposition that I have addressed my remarks and upon which I desire to add a few words. I have no disposition, Mr. President, to unduly detain the Senate, and certainly I will not do so. I would not add to what I have already said were it not that some things have been said in the debate which possibly require that I should do so, and in so doing what I shall say will be necessarily somewhat irregular in point of arrangement.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the main question, which I think is made necessary by some things which were said on yesterday, I wish to comply with the promise which I made to the

Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] that I would give the reasons why I thought that even the minimum number of men named in the bill was more than were required for the needs of an ordinary time.

I understand, of course, Mr. President, that the provision for a minimum is intended to apply to a normal condition of peace, and that the maximum is intended for an abnormal time. It is with that understanding that I repeat what I said yesterday in response to the suggestion of the Senator from Wisconsin as to what my attitude was with reference to this matter, that I think that is too great for the normal condition.

The President of the United States in his message says that the fortifications, the coastwise defenses, will require about 18,000 men. I repeat, as the Senator from Wisconsin may not have heard me—I noticed he was engaged at the time—that my estimate of the number of men required for the minimum is the estimate which I understand to be required for a normal time of peace, and therefore it is upon that basis that I make the estimate which I now state.

If 18,000 men or thereabouts are all that are required for the coastwise defenses, with a total of 58,000 as the minimum, it would leave some 40,000 men for the other needs of the country in times of normal conditions of peace. Of course, I have no reference to the Philippines or to Cuba. I have reference to the part of the country which we have always been accustomed to call the United States. I say, Mr. President, that there is no possible requirement that I can understand for that number of men outside of the coast defenses. We do not need as large a standing army for the interior defenses as we formerly did, because the dangers from Indians have very largely decreased and almost entirely disappeared. Of course, it requires some troops, but few in comparison with what were required in the former time.

But, Mr. President, it is not upon my own estimate alone that I stated to the Senate on yesterday that I regarded the minimum as too great, but I was guided by the action of this body in the last session, and by the statements of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR] made at this session relative thereto. In the last session, having no reference to the Philippine Islands or Cuba and having reference to our own domestic requirements, this body passed a bill for an increase of the Army, which was deemed necessary for these domestic purposes.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Will the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. BACON. With pleasure.

Mr. WARREN. I should like to ask the Senator from Georgia where he gets the information upon which he makes the statement that the bill which was reported from the committee and passed was thought to be sufficient at the time?

Mr. BACON. I will do so with pleasure, and I was proceeding to do so. The bill which we now have before us, and which is sought to be displaced by the substitute which was sent to us from the House, and as amended by the Military Committee of the Senate—the original bill—is the one I speak about. It is on the Senator's desk now. That bill, having in view the requirements for our own domestic affairs, added to the Army which would exist at the expiration of the present term of service, July 1, of the men who were enlisted two years ago, 5,000 men as the number which would be required.

The number to which the 5,000 was added was about 29,000, and the 5,000 added makes 34,000. So that here was the action of the Senate, under the suggestion of the Military Committee of the Senate, solemnly adjudging that so far as our own needs were concerned, and without reference to Cuba or the Philippine Islands, the 5,000 men were those which were required to be added to the regular military establishment of 29,000 men in order that we might not only meet the other requirements inside of this domestic territory—if I may use that phrase—but also to add the needed number for the coastwise defenses.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President—

Mr. BACON. If the Senator from Vermont will just pardon me a moment, he may correct anything he may wish in the statement which I will make relative to himself, which I propose now to do.

When the present bill came before the Senate last week, and the Senator from Vermont was upon the floor explaining the provisions of the bill, I asked him if the Military Committee still considered that the 5,000 men which were provided for in the bill was the number required to be added on account of the additional force called for by our coast defenses, and the Senator from Vermont responded in the affirmative. Now, it is upon those bases that I say that outside of the Philippine question and the Cuban question the Army ought not to be over 34,000 men, or thereabouts. Now, I will yield to the Senator from Vermont with pleasure.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, I do not recall the discussion of last winter, but in the most elaborate statement I have made here on this bill I tried to make it very plain that the minimum

of 54,000 would be needed at all times, in times of peace. I stated the needs of Alaska, which had never existed until within a few months and were liable to be increased. A regiment is there now. With Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the increase of the artillery, I said 54,000 as a minimum was the least that could safely be authorized.

Mr. BACON. I did not intend to represent the Senator otherwise. I simply said that the Military Committee, when it passed the bill at the last session, thought that the addition of 5,000 men was all that was required on account of the coastwise defense for the artillery arm of the service, and not representing that the Senator had said that that was all that was required for the size of the Army. I had asked him the question during this debate, on the first day of it, last Thursday a week, whether the Military Committee was still of the opinion that the addition of 5,000 men was all that was required on account of the artillery arm of the service called for by reason of the coast defenses, and the Senator had said yes.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, that addition is substantially the same so far as the artillery is concerned that is made in this bill. There is an addition of only five regiments.

Mr. BACON. I understood that fact. I am simply explaining that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] yesterday had said that he did not understand even myself as objecting to the minimum which was expressed in this bill for the Army. I had replied to him that I did object, and that when an opportunity offered I would give the reasons for the objection and for the opinion which I had that even the minimum was too great, and I still think so. If we allow the estimate made by the President of the United States to be the correct estimate, and I know of nothing to the contrary, that it will require 18,000 men properly to man our seacoast defenses, 17,000 men in addition thereto, in my opinion, are ample for all the needs of the Government outside of the abnormal demands of the Philippine Islands and of Cuba. I think it will be difficult to state wherein the demands of the Government, outside of these abnormal demands of which I speak, will require exceeding that number of men.

Mr. BURROWS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me for a moment?

Mr. BACON. With pleasure.

Mr. BURROWS. The Senator states very properly that the Secretary of War and the President of the United States recommend and estimate a force of 18,420 men for coast defenses. Has not the Senator overlooked the fact that the Secretary of War and the President also state that it will require 26,000 men to man our posts? There are 105 of them throughout the country, and they say that number is needed for that purpose.

Mr. BACON. To man our posts? I should like to know for what purpose any large force is required to man our posts in the interior of the country. In former years when we had hostile Indians, of course it was important that the posts on the frontiers should be manned by a fighting force, and it is necessary now that there should be a reasonable force in order that there may not be a recurrence of Indian hostilities, but there is need of a very much reduced force. But is it necessary, because the Government has scattered through the country here and there a military post, that we should have a large standing army to man those posts, when a company of men in each one of them is sufficient to take care of the property and to represent the authority of the Government at those posts? I take issue with such contention, Mr. President.

Mr. MONEY. If we must have troops just to man the posts it would be better to burn down half of them.

Mr. BACON. I will not say that. The Senator can say it.

Mr. MONEY. I say it.

Mr. BACON. I would not go quite to that extreme; but still it is not necessary that in order to maintain posts we should have a great standing army. Not simply a company, but a platoon of men is enough to keep up a post in time of peace.

Mr. President, I do not agree with the suggestion which has frequently been made on this floor, and which has been made elsewhere, that the question of the increase of our population is one which should control the size of our standing army. I do not recognize the logic of the proposition that when the population of a free, self-governing republic is doubled the army has to be doubled. I see no reason for it. Upon what hypothesis could such a proposition be sustained? It must necessarily be upon the hypothesis that an army is needed to control the people, and therefore if the number of the people is to be increased, the number of the army to control the people must be increased. I deny the basis upon which any such proposition could be founded.

Mr. SCOTT. Will the Senator from Georgia allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. BACON. With pleasure.

Mr. SCOTT. Does the Senator from Georgia think that the vote last November indicated that the people were afraid of an increased Army?

Mr. BACON. With the permission of the Senator from West Virginia, if he will wait until I get through—I am very much



obliged to him for the suggestion—I will say a word or two on that subject. I do not wish to be diverted right at this time, but I hope, if I forget it, the Senator from West Virginia will call me to my feet, because I want to say something on that point.

I repeat, Mr. President, there is no logic in the proposition that the increase of the Army should be in proportion to the increase of our population. On the contrary, it should be otherwise, because our Army is not intended for the government of our people. Our Army is not intended for that, because the assumption, and the correct and justifiable assumption, is that our people need no army to control them. It is against the spirit and genius of our institutions that we should have an army to control our people. Our theory is that every man here in this country is himself a soldier, not for the control of the people of this country, but to defend the country against foreign enemies whenever the demands require it. The greater the population among a patriotic, brave, liberty-loving people, the greater their ability through the system of volunteer soldiery to protect themselves against domestic disorder and against foreign foes, and the less necessity for a standing army in like proportion.

So it has nothing to do with it. If our population becomes double what it now is, unless there should be some other reason than the simple fact of increased population, there is in this alone no reason or basis for an increase of the Army.

I am in favor of a proper standing army, and I have pride in our standing Army. I have pride in it because it rests upon the great, broad basis of being simply the exponent, the type, the nucleus of the great army which is ever at the command of this people whenever there is need for them, not to be numbered by tens of thousands, but to be numbered by millions of men.

But, Mr. President, I wish to address principally what I have to say to the objection which seems to me to be the most serious one in connection with this bill. That is not simply the increase of the Army. It is a very serious matter that we should have a large standing army in time of peace, but the most objectionable feature in the bill proposing to authorize this great Regular Army is that which I have already partially discussed, and which I have denominated as the abdication of the power of Congress to raise armies, and the investment of that power in the President of the United States.

If the power to raise armies is a power devolved upon Congress and intended to be exercised by Congress, it is an abdication if Congress in a practical way devolves that duty upon the President of the United States.

Now let us see what the Constitution says about that. Upon whom does it devolve the power to raise armies? The power is found in the twelfth subdivision of the enumerated powers of Congress. In section 8 of the first article of the Constitution is found the magnificent array of powers, and in this great array almost all the powers of government, outside of the execution of the laws and the adjudication of contests between citizens, are devolved upon Congress—powers which under other systems were vested in an absolute king or monarch are enumerated and devolved upon the Congress representing the States and the people, the framers of the Constitution deeming that that was the course to be pursued in order that our system might be perpetual and that the liberties of the people should never be jeopardized by an undue exercise of power by one man who might be chosen to high place.

In the twelfth enumeration of these powers here is this distinct language. I read the first line of section 8, Article I:

The Congress shall have power—

Then enumerating the first, second, third, etc., to the twelfth—to raise and support armies.

That is the distinct enunciation of the Constitution. What does the Constitution mean when it says that "Congress shall have power to raise and support armies?" Does it mean simply to give Congress the power to do it at its option, or does it mean that Congress shall do it? Does it mean to say that Congress, if it see fit in time of necessity, may raise armies and provide for their support, or does it mean that Congress shall raise armies and provide for their support? Of course, nobody will say anything but the latter; that it is a command on Congress—not simply a permission, but a command on Congress to raise armies.

Mr. President, does this bill when it becomes a law carry out that command, or does it abdicate the duty imposed by that command? What is the power proposed in the bill? The power proposed in the bill is that the President of the United States shall have the power, in his discretion, at any time to raise an army of 50,000 men by increasing the Army by that many men. There is a difference between empowering the President to enlist a few recruits, and the other power to decide when he shall add 50,000 men to the Army, when he shall discharge them and when he shall again add that number to the Army. Are 50,000 men an army, or are they a few recruits to fill vacancies? If they constitute an army, then when such an army is raised it should, under the command

of the Constitution, be raised by the direct authority and the exclusive authority of Congress.

Are 50,000 men an army? Why, Mr. President, it is nearly as many men as Napoleon had when he fought the battle of Waterloo. It is nearly as many men as fought under General Lee in the terrific world-renowned battles of the Wilderness—within a fraction of the number of men he had in those great battles. It is a greater army than has fought under any one banner in the average great battles of the world. The enlistment of that number of men in the discretion of the President is not to be analogized to the exercise by the President of the power to fill up the depleted ranks, to recruit men to replace those who have died or who have deserted or who have been discharged. It is a power to raise a great army, not only once, but as often as the President may choose. It is a power that the Constitution of the United States not only does not give to the President, but it is a power which the Constitution of the United States, although it uses the language of authority, intends as the language of command—that it shall be done by Congress.

Senators say if we fix a limit we can trust the President within the limit, and Senators seek to make a personal application of it in the inquiry, Can we not trust the President? I decline to measure this question by any such personal consideration. There never has been a President to whom I would be willing to intrust such power; and there is no man living to whom hereafter I would be willing to intrust it.

Mr. SPOONER. The Senator does not mean to impute any such observation as that to me?

Mr. BACON. I am speaking generally.

Mr. SPOONER. No, not generally.

Mr. BACON. I say that in general. Of course, I do not mean to put those words in the mouth of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. SPOONER. I said yesterday, what I repeat, that discretionary power had for many years been given to the President as to the raising of an army; that it had never been abused, and probably never will be abused; and, if it were, the matter is entirely and at all times within the control and corrective of Congress.

Mr. BACON. I did not have special reference to the Senator, although from the very kind attention he was giving to me I think I possibly looked him directly in the face when I made the statement.

Mr. SPOONER. I always give attention to the Senator.

Mr. BACON. I did not have any special allusion to the Senator, but what I stated has been said by a number of Senators.

Mr. SPOONER. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. BACON. Certainly.

Mr. SPOONER. Would the Senator regard as unconstitutional an act of Congress authorizing the President to raise not exceeding 12 regiments of infantry?

Mr. BACON. No, sir; I do not think any of those bills in the past have been unconstitutional.

Mr. SPOONER. Why not?

Mr. BACON. Because no single one of them invested the President with the power which it is sought to clothe him with in this bill, which is the power not simply to raise an army for a specified purpose or for a specified time, but a power which puts it in his discretion at all times in the future, so long as this act stays upon the statute books, to say whether the Army shall be 50,000 men or whether it shall be 100,000 men. There is a vast difference between that and any one of the statutes which were passed, and which were spoken of here yesterday, read by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. FORAKER], and repeated by the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SEWELL] this morning.

Mr. FORAKER. If the Senator will allow me, I should like him to specify how this provision differs in point of principle from the statute, for instance, that I cited yesterday, passed in 1846, giving the President power to increase the Army in the way therein provided.

Mr. BACON. The statute of 1846, as stated on yesterday, was passed in view of the imminent prospect and anticipation of the Mexican war, which broke out that very year.

Mr. SPOONER. Was that within the constitutional power of Congress?

Mr. FORAKER. And that was without any limitation.

Mr. BACON. Which one of the two Senators shall I answer?

Mr. SPOONER. Both of us.

Mr. BACON. All right. There is not a single statute, from the act of 1799 down to the act of 1846, or any other, which contemplates the placing upon the statute books of a regular perpetual law which shall relieve Congress of the duty of saying whether the Army shall be 50,000 men—I use that figure simply for illustration—or 100,000 men; in other words, which does not simply contemplate authority to the President to raise an army up to a specified figure for a certain purpose, but which intended that without any action by Congress thereafter the power should rest with him, when that emergency had passed, to say when

another emergency had come, and whether or not that emergency had come, and, if it had come, to determine to what extent the Army should, by his sole command, be increased to meet it.

There is no such statute upon the books, and it can not be found. Every law to which the Senators have alluded is a law which had reference to a specific emergency, which was in immediate contemplation, and there was no anticipation but that with the disappearance of that emergency that law would practically be at an end.

But now, Mr. President, I am going a little further—

Mr. SPOONER. I want to understand the Senator, if he will permit me.

Mr. BACON. Certainly, always.

Mr. SPOONER. Is it the Senator's proposition that Congress must absolutely fix the size of the Army and leave no discretion whatever, under the Constitution, to the President in that regard?

Mr. BACON. I say this, Mr. President, that if Congress has in view a certain emergency, where it can not be foretold what will be necessary, under the practical necessity of the situation it may generally invest the President with the authority to take command of whatever troops may be available, and for this urgent necessity to increase the standing Army and to call out the militia. But if the Senator means by his question whether or not there shall be upon the statute books a permanent statute having reference to a permanent organization, giving authority to the President, within his discretion, and without action by Congress, to make it a large army or a small army, within a range of 50,000 men, I say most undoubtedly it is a violation of this section of the Constitution.

Mr. SPOONER. There is nothing said in the Constitution, as I recollect, about "permanent" in relation to the Army; and there is nothing said about it "being in contemplation."

Mr. BACON. That is true; but the practical operation—

Mr. SPOONER. And there is nothing about "a fixed Regular Army," nor is there anything said in the Constitution about "an exigency."

Mr. BACON. I will ask the Senator this question, and perhaps in that way reply to his question.

Mr. SPOONER. The question that I want to ask the Senator is this: Is it his contention that under the Constitution Congress must absolutely in each case fix the limit?

Mr. BACON. Within the range—

Mr. SPOONER. That is not within any range.

Mr. FORAKER. Let the Senator state the range. Let us have a definition of the range.

Mr. SPOONER. That is what I am coming to.

Mr. BACON. I wish the two Senators would agree between themselves as to which one of them shall conduct this cross-examination.

Mr. SPOONER. I am not cross-examining the Senator.

Mr. BACON. Of course I made the suggestion in all good humor.

Mr. SPOONER. I want to get at the Senator's position, if I can. I should like to know whether it is the Senator's contention that under the Constitution Congress must fix absolutely the size of the Army, leaving no discretion whatever to the President.

Mr. BACON. I endeavored to answer that just now. It is the duty of Congress to raise the armies required for the defense of the country. It is the duty of Congress to definitely fix the number so far as it is practicable to do so. In practical operation it may be necessary to meet an emergency within reasonable limits for a specified purpose, to direct the President what to do in raising the required army. So far as it is practicable for Congress to definitely fix the number of the army, that is required, and if it is not practicable, then there must necessarily be some latitude—for instance, in the presence of an urgent danger. Take the act of 1795. I say that is constitutional.

Mr. SPOONER. Then the Senator—

Mr. BACON. When the Senator asks me a question, he certainly will permit me to reply.

Mr. SPOONER. Certainly.

Mr. BACON. If the Senator will take the act of 1795, he will find that in anticipation of war with France—

Mr. FORAKER. Seventeen hundred and ninety-nine.

Mr. BACON. I should have said 1799. The act of 1795 was the one in reference to the militia.

That act was passed in anticipation of war with France, under conditions where it was an impossibility for Congress to anticipate when the war would be precipitated or what would be the force that would be brought against us; because, as I said yesterday, the first intimation of actual war, in the absence of the opportunity for knowledge that we now have by cable, might have been the appearance on our shores of a hostile fleet with transports full of soldiers. The population of the country at that time was scattered, without means of prompt communication, involving weeks of time to obtain information or to assemble Congress, and therefore it was necessary, in order that the conditions which might

unexpectedly be presented should be met, for Congress to do what it did do, to give to the President of the United States the power to call out the militia as well as to increase the Army for the emergency and to set no limitation as to the militia. I say that was a constitutional act. The practical necessities of the case required that Congress should provide in that way for the defense of the country against imminent danger.

But, Mr. President, I repeat that when Congress puts upon the statute books an act which is not for a particular emergency where the necessities of the case must necessarily control, but which for all time leaves it within the discretion of the President to make by his order the Regular Army in time of peace either 50,000 or 100,000, as he may choose, that is a violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution.

Mr. SPOONER. Then the Senator's position, as I understand it, is this: That under the Constitution Congress may lawfully commit to the President the discretionary power as to the size of the Army to meet an imminent or apprehended exigency, but can not constitutionally commit to the President any discretionary power as to the size of the Army between limits to meet possible and unforeseen exigencies.

Mr. BACON. I say that where the conditions are such that that matter can be determined by Congress it is the duty of Congress to determine it, and it is the intention of the Constitution that Congress should determine it. In a case of emergency it may be an impossibility for Congress to determine it, and Congress must then provide for the necessary defense in the only way that is practicable; but when you come to put upon the statute books a law that shall stay there for all time, which leaves to the President to determine the size of the Army within a range of 50,000 men, you abdicate the duty of Congress in so doing.

Mr. RAWLINS. Will the Senator yield to me to ask him a question?

Mr. BACON. Certainly, with pleasure.

Mr. RAWLINS. I only ask this question in order to get a fair understanding of the position of the Senator from Georgia on this matter.

If I understand the position of the Senator, it is that Congress may absolutely, without conditions, fix the size of the army to be raised, or it may direct the President, upon a given and specific contingency, to raise an army of a given size, and that in each case it is the will of Congress, that there is no discretion in the President except as the contingency arises, and the power only which Congress intended to clothe him with is the power that he may exercise.

Mr. SPOONER. That is what I understood the Senator from Georgia to say.

Mr. BACON. I am not sure that I fully caught the import of the suggestion of the Senator, but I have endeavored to make my meaning clear, and I will still further illustrate it.

If the contention of Senators here is defensible, Congress can not only say that the President can raise the Army by a stroke of his pen from 50,000 to 100,000 or to any intermediate number, but it may say we do not think that the necessities of the Government will ever exceed a million men, and we will fix a minimum of 50,000 and give the President the power at any time that he sees proper when, in his opinion, the public interests require it, to raise an army of a million men or of half a million, as he may choose. Does not the Senator recognize that under such a law the President would be invested with the power to raise armies? Would not that be an abdication of its powers by Congress? Would the Senator say that was a constitutional law?

Mr. SPOONER. I should say it was constitutional.

Mr. BACON. And trust to him at any time to reduce it to the minimum of 50,000, and at his will and as often as he chose raise it to half a million, or twice that number?

Mr. SPOONER. I should say it was a constitutional law, but that it was a very stupid law.

Mr. BACON. The Senator would think that was a constitutional law?

Mr. SPOONER. Yes; I do not think the question of constitutional power depends on the size of the Army any more than I think a constitutional army depends upon an exigency, seen or unforeseen.

Mr. BACON. Certainly, and for that reason I gave the Senator the extreme illustration of a million men.

Mr. SPOONER. As I said to the Senator yesterday, under existing law, within ten days after we adjourn, the President could call into the service for nine months 5,000,000 men.

Mr. BACON. Exactly, and I will come to that before I get through, if I am permitted.

Mr. SPOONER. And we would have to pay them for that nine months' service.

Mr. BACON. Yes; but they would be volunteers, not regulars.

Mr. SPOONER. What is the difference?

Mr. BACON. I am coming to that, if the Senator will permit me to take it up in due course. I want to illustrate this thing;



I am speaking on the question whether this bill abdicates the power of Congress.

Mr. SPOONER. If the Senator will permit me—and I shall not interrupt him again—it is as much the function of Congress to regulate the reduction of the Army as to regulate its increase.

Mr. BACON. I think so.

Mr. SPOONER. Does the Senator think it would be incompetent for Congress, under the Constitution, we having decided that there should be for the present an Army of 100,000 men, to give the President, when the exigency shall have passed, the power to reduce it?

Mr. BACON. I think that probably could be constitutionally done.

Mr. SPOONER. And properly be done?

Mr. BACON. Yes; but to put upon the statute book a law which shall say that the President shall, at his will, without reference to any special time or any special necessity, use the power conferred on him to increase the Army or to decrease it in peace or in war, without responsibility to anyone or question by anyone—that, I say, is an utter violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution.

Mr. President, I want to illustrate this question as to whether or not this is an abdication of power, whether it is an abdication of power for Congress to fix an extreme limit for the size of the Army, the maximum, and then to say that the President can at any time, in peace or in war, indefinitely in the future, either raise the Army to the maximum or reduce it to the minimum, and repeat that process as often as he may see fit—whether that is within his constitutional power. In the same sentence in the Constitution coupled with the power to raise armies is the power to support armies: "The Congress shall have power to raise and support armies," which means that Congress shall raise armies and shall support them. The succeeding part of the same sentence is:

But no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

Now, for the purpose of illustration, suppose that last clause was not there and the sentence simply read in this way: "The Congress shall have power to raise and support armies," without any limitation as to the length of time for which the appropriation could be made for that purpose. Suppose Congress should, upon this law, which proposes to vest the President with the authority, in his discretion, to have the size of the Army 100,000 men or an army of 50,000, and to alternate it between the two figures as often as he might see fit, in addition ingraft thereon an appropriation of \$500,000,000.

Suppose that, having provided in the act that the President should control the size of the Army at his will, Congress should further provide that the President could, in his discretion, within the limit of \$500,000,000, use as much of that as was, in his opinion, needed for the support of the Army, whether much or little; would that be an abdication of power by Congress? Would it be an abdication of power for us to appropriate money for the support of the Army, fixing the outside maximum of what we supposed would ever be called for, and, without any specification as to how it should be expended, say that the President should each year for all time spend as much of that as he saw fit? That is directly analogous. The very same authority which confers upon Congress the power and invests it with the duty to appropriate money for the support of the Army also lays upon the Congress the duty to raise armies.

If Congress can delegate to the President the power to raise an army of 50,000 men by the stroke of his pen, it can delegate to him the power to raise half a million men, and it could, if the Constitution did not limit the time of appropriation, also, without an abdication of its power, appropriate the vast sum of \$500,000,000 for the annual support of the Army, and provide that within that limit each year the President could, without further authority from Congress, use such amount as he saw fit to support the Army. The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army, but it never intended that he should have the right to raise armies or control the purse which is necessary to support it.

Possibly Senators may refer me to the fact that three years ago we did put \$50,000,000 at the service of the President for the public defense. It was an act of very doubtful constitutionality, and I do not know what better reply I can make to the Senators who are constantly suggesting the question as to whether or not we can trust the President than to recall the fact that, doubtful as was the question, without a dissenting vote, without a word spoken on the floor of this Senate by any Senator, but in absolute silence and with absolute unanimity, this money was put in his control for his disbursement in his discretion. But that does not establish the fact of its constitutionality, and I do not think there can be anything which can more strongly bring to the realization of Senators the unconstitutionality of this measure than to recite the fact that the very same sentence that makes it the duty of Congress to raise armies makes it also the duty of Congress to

appropriate money for the support of the Army. If we can abdicate the one, we can abdicate the other. If the delegation of power in the one case is an abdication, the delegation of the power in the other case would also be an abdication.

The Senator from Wisconsin has referred to the act of 1795, which put at the disposal of the President the militia of the United States. My reply to that is that the two things are entirely different; that there is no possible analogy between them; that while a large regular army is at war with the genius of our institutions, subversive of those institutions and menacing to them, the volunteer system which bases our military power upon our citizen soldiery is the very basis, and the strongest basis, for the maintenance of the free institutions of this country. This is a fundamental principle in the Constitution, in which is found the language—

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State.

Mr. President, I can not too strongly impress upon Senators the fact that this proposition to create a great standing army and to forever wipe out the volunteer system is the feature which marks more clearly than anything else the great revolution upon which this proposed law will start us.

That the policy of those who advocate the creation of this regular army of 100,000 men is to destroy the volunteer system and to no longer use in future wars the volunteer organizations known generally as the National Guard is not to be doubted. The National Guard, composed of the most patriotic and spirited young men of the nation, are hereafter to be composed of those who will be only tin soldiers. When the serious business of war comes they will not be recognized.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR], a former Secretary of War and a leading member of the Military Committee of the Senate, during this debate, in speaking of past and future wars, said:

The expense of a volunteer organization is a mistake which should not be repeated.

In every war which we have heretofore had our volunteer organizations have had associated with them the names of the States from which they came, so that every soldier had as a stimulant to duty and, Mr. President, if need be, to sacrifice, not only national pride, but the potent recollection that he had in his keeping the honor and good name of his State. In every war we have had the volunteers have carried into battle the names of their States, but under the policy of this law the names of the organizations known as the National Guard are no longer to be known in the history of the wars which sooner or later will surely come.

The first step in this direction was taken under the act of 1899, and while there are to-day 35,000 volunteers in the Philippines, no regiment bears the name of any State or volunteer organization. The only thing which distinguishes them from the regulars is that the act under which they are enlisted calls them volunteers.

And thus step by step we go on toward the abandonment of the volunteer system and the substitution of the great Regular Army in its stead. When the volunteer system is abandoned there will have been discarded the strongest defense of our free institutions. When a great standing army has been forever fastened upon the country there will be constructed the weapon the most powerful for the destruction of those institutions.

Is there anyone who could see the creation of a regular army of 300,000 men in the United States without alarm for the safety of our institutions? Well, sir, an army of 300,000 three years hence is not as impossible as an army of 100,000 appeared to be three years ago. And yet it seems now that the army of 100,000 men has come to stay with us, with the probability that it will be increased rather than decreased in the near future.

Mr. President, those who favor this Regular Army of 100,000 men are not acting candidly and frankly with the American people. Out of what arises the need for an army of this magnitude? Whatever may be the personal wish of any Senator, is there a single Senator here who is willing to rise in his place and say to the Senate and to the country that he favors the creation and permanent maintenance of an army of 100,000 men independently of the needs growing out of the war in the Philippine Islands? I am sure there is no Senator who is willing to now make such avowal.

Let it be conceded, then, for the purposes of this argument, that the war in the Philippines makes it necessary at this time that we should have an army of 100,000 men.

The vital, the overshadowing, question that immediately and necessarily arises is, Does the present necessity for 100,000 men require that there should be the permanent organization of an army of that magnitude? If the Philippines are to be permanently retained, and if their retention will require for all time that the United States shall keep up a regular army of 100,000 men, then the advocates of this bill should say so frankly. They should say, We advocate a regular army of 100,000 men because, to hold the Philippine Islands it is necessary that, not for a time, but that permanently and for all time, we should have a regular army of



100,000 men. With this frank avowal the people of the United States could look the situation squarely in the face and determine whether they wished to dominate a colony in Asia at the annual cost of an army of 100,000 men, a cost to be estimated not only in sacrifice of life, but of over \$100,000,000 every year that passes. On the other hand, if the need of this great army for the Philippines is temporary, the advocates of this bill should say so, and the lawmaking power should fix the limit of time within which the Army shall be reduced to the size required not by the temporary needs but by the permanent needs of the country.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] estimates that within a few years 20,000 men will be sufficient to meet the requirements in the Philippines. Why, then, should a permanent army be created of 100,000 men when 75,000 of them are estimated for the needs of the Philippines, needs which in two or three years are to be reduced to 20,000 men?

Mr. President, I notice that several Senators who have asked me questions with reference to the last election are not now in the Chamber and therefore—

Mr. FORAKER. Before the Senator passes away from that point I wish to call his attention to one or two other statutory provisions which I have found since this matter was under consideration yesterday; and if the Senator will allow me, by way of forming a predicate for what I want to call his attention to, I wish to state what I understand he has just now been contending for, namely, that while it is true that having reference to the threat of war with France in 1799 we gave the President discretion as to the size of the Army, and did the same again in 1846 when we were threatened with war with Mexico, yet that legislation was justified only on the ground that there was then an emergency threatening, and that it is unconstitutional and bad policy and without precedent to intrust the President with any discretion except only in time of threatened war.

I understood the Senator to say that there could not be found any statute that conferred upon the President the right to exercise such a power in time of peace. I want to answer all that. I do not understand that in 1850 we were threatened with war by anybody, and yet I find in volume 9 of the United States Statutes at Large, page 438, a statute which conferred upon the President precisely that kind of discretion. I will read from it. In the first section Congress designated the organizations that shall compose the Army, and then in section 2 they provide:

That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, by voluntary enlistment, to increase the number of privates in each or any of the companies of the existing regiments of the Army at present serving, or which may hereafter serve, at the several military posts on the western frontier and at remote and distant stations, to any number not exceeding 74, and to cause such portions of the Army as may, by law, be serving on foot to be properly equipped and mounted whenever, in his opinion, the exigency of the public service may require the same: *Provided*, That the said enlistments shall be for the term of five years, unless sooner discharged.

In other words, that was a time of profound peace, a time when we were not threatened by any nation with war, a time, therefore, when, according to the Senator's proposition, it was the duty of Congress to fix the size of the Army, and when it was beyond the Constitution and without precedent to give the President any discretion about it; and yet Congress so provided.

Now, if that were all it might be excused upon the ground that that was not very much of a discretion, because the Army at that time was not very large and the President was not authorized to add very greatly to the existing strength of it. So much for that. I also find that in 1866, by the act of July 28 of that year, found in volume 14 of the United States Statutes at Large, page 332 and following, Congress provided what I shall read. That, too, was at a time when they reorganized the Army with reference to a peace basis. No war threatened then. We had just passed through a great war. It was a time of profound peace, and they were providing for an army that we should maintain in time of peace. This is what section 6 provided:

That each regiment of infantry provided for by this act shall have 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 regimental quartermaster, 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 1 commissary-sergeant, 1 hospital steward, 2 principal musicians, and 10 companies; and the adjutant and quartermaster shall hereafter be extra lieutenants selected from the first or second lieutenants of the regiment. Each company shall have 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, and 1 second lieutenant, 1 first sergeant, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 artificers, 2 musicians, 1 wagoner, and 50 privates.

That was the minimum of the Army. That was what Congress prescribed should be its strength. They fixed the size of the different arms. They fixed the number of organizations. They determined how many regiments we should have, into how many companies they should be divided, who should be the officers, and how many there should be of them, of the regiments and the companies, respectively; and then they determined who the non-commissioned officers should be and how many of them; then they fixed the number of privates at 50—that was for peace; and then they provided as follows:

And the number of privates may be increased at the discretion of the President, not to exceed 100, whenever the exigencies of the service require such increase.

Mr. President, if it be true, as I have stated, that at that time we were not threatened with any war, that we were simply making preparations for a time of peace, that we were fixing a minimum for a time of peace, and authorizing the President to exercise the power, at his discretion, to increase the Army, then it seems to me that the Senator should revise what he said this morning when he stated, if I understood him, that there was absolutely no precedent whatever for such legislation as we are now proposing; that there has never been any such legislation, except only in such cases as were referred to yesterday, when we legislated with reference to a possible foreign war, with which, at the particular time, we happened to be threatened.

It is true that in each case pointed out yesterday there was an emergency threatened, and that the legislation had reference to that; yet the legislation in each instance did not provide specifically for that emergency, but provided generally, and it was legislation that was to continue in effect until Congress saw fit to change the provision it had seen fit to make.

But the cases which I point out to-day are entirely unlike those of yesterday—the one in 1850 and the other in 1866—neither having reference to any emergency that was threatened, neither having reference to any impending danger, both having reference to an army in time of peace, and both providing a minimum which should be the normal strength of the Army in time of peace, and both conferring upon the President a discretion to increase the Army whenever in his opinion there was any exigency that justified his doing so.

That is all we are proposing to do here. We are simply establishing an army, providing what its organization shall be, providing what the minimum number of the enlisted men shall be, and then providing that the President shall have power, in his discretion, not to increase the number of regiments, not to increase the number of companies, not to add to the organization of the Army, but merely to add by way of recruiting to the strength of each company so far as enlisted men are concerned. That is exactly the provision of 1850, and exactly the provision of 1866. In 1850 it did not involve a very large increase in the Army, because the Army was then small, but it involved an increase of some seven or eight thousand men, possibly.

Mr. SPOONER. The principle is the same.

Mr. FORAKER. Yes; the principle was the same. In 1866 it involved a very large increase, for it involved the increase of the men in each of the 10 companies of 45 regiments from 50 men to 100 men.

Mr. SPOONER. Of course, the principle is just the same, whether the Army was large or small.

Mr. FORAKER. The principle is precisely the same. So, what I want to point out and make absolutely certain is that according to the record it is shown that there is no warrant for the statement that in proposing this legislation there is a departure from what has been done heretofore. On the contrary, instead of this being without precedent, it is strictly in line with precedents. The only distinction the Senator undertook to make this morning was that the cases pointed out yesterday had reference to threats of war and danger and emergencies, in the presence of which Congress was legislating. Now, at the time when this legislation was passed no such emergencies were threatened.

Nobody ever questioned the constitutionality of those laws, and I do not know of any ground upon which the constitutionality of any of these statutes could be questioned. It does seem to me that if the Senator concedes that we have the power to confer upon the President a right to increase the Army at one time he must concede that we have the power to authorize him to increase it at another.

Mr. ALLEN. Will the Senator permit me a question?

Mr. FORAKER. Certainly.

Mr. ALLEN. What is the practical distinction between increasing regiments already in existence and creating new regiments?

Mr. FORAKER. It is simply this: We have been talking about the policy, as well as the power, of doing what we are doing. I was speaking in that regard to the policy. I think it is a wise thing to maintain the various organizations at a minimum and to give the discretion to the President to increase from the minimum to the maximum the number of men, instead of increasing the organizations—the regiments and the companies and the batteries—which would involve also an increase of officers. There is no increase of officers under this bill, but simply an increase of the enlisted force.

Mr. ALLEN. As the Senator, however, said—

Mr. FORAKER. Let me follow that with just one other remark. The advantage is one that I know the Senator is familiar with and will appreciate. A recruit, put into an organization already drilled and disciplined, as this contemplates, would be a much more effective soldier than he would be if he were put into an organization with only other recruits who had never been drilled.

Mr. ALLEN. I recognize that fact, but the Senator said that



this bill simply permitted an increase of the size of companies from the minimum to the maximum—

Mr. FORAKER. The increase of the strength of each company.

Mr. ALLEN. And did not authorize the creation of new regiments.

Mr. FORAKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALLEN. The question I put to the Senator is this: What is the practical distinction between the two methods of raising the Army to a maximum?

Mr. FORAKER. There is no difference whatever so far as the question of power is concerned, but a good deal of difference so far as the question of policy is concerned. I think it is far wiser, if we authorize the President to increase the Army, to authorize him to increase the organizations already in the field by recruiting them than to multiply the organizations.

Mr. ALLEN. If Congress has the power to give the President in his discretion authority to increase a regiment or a company or a brigade or whatever it may be from the minimum to the maximum, does it not, by force of the same reasoning, have power to authorize him to create new regiments?

Mr. FORAKER. Certainly; I think so. I say it is not a question of power. It is a question of policy. I think the power of Congress is ample to authorize the President by proper provision to increase the Army by adding new regiments or by increasing to a maximum number the regiments ordered.

Mr. ALLEN. If Congress should authorize the President to create new regiments, would not that be a clear abdication of the constitutional authority resting upon Congress?

Mr. FORAKER. Not at all, in my judgment. I think Congress has a right to say that the Army shall be maintained at a minimum strength, whatever it sees fit to name, whether that be made up of organizations already organized or whether it be made up of organizations authorized, some of which are organized and some of which are to be organized, whenever that discretion is exercised.

Mr. ALLEN. Can the Congress delegate a power that is vested in it by the Constitution?

Mr. FORAKER. No; certainly not; and the contention is that Congress is not delegating its power. Congress is simply providing what the Army shall be—what its minimum shall be, and what its maximum shall be in certain emergencies, and it is pointing out a way, in the exercise of its power, for the increase of the Army in that emergency.

Mr. ALLEN. I trust I am not disturbing the Senator.

Mr. FORAKER. Not at all. I only feel like apologizing to the Senator from Georgia, who politely allowed me to interrupt him that I might call his attention to these statutes.

Mr. BACON. I was afraid that in the zeal of the argument the Senator from Ohio had forgotten that fact.

Mr. FORAKER. No, indeed, I have not; but I trust the Senator will not hold me guilty for all the time taken.

Mr. ALLEN. Let me call the attention of the Senator from Ohio to this provision:

Congress shall have power \* \* \* to raise and support armies.

I will not read the balance of the clause. Is not that an exclusive power?

Mr. FORAKER. Yes; I think Congress is the only power that could do so; and I think if there were no statute on the books the President could not go to work and organize an army. Congress can prescribe how many regiments of cavalry and how many regiments of artillery and how many regiments of infantry there shall be, and what the strength of the Signal Corps and the Engineer Corps shall be, and so on to the end, and then Congress can, in the exercise of this power, provide a way by authorizing the President to organize an army such as it has provided for.

Mr. ALLEN. That is a grant of power.

Mr. FORAKER. Well, all our powers are granted by the people. The Constitution is an enumeration of grants, in one view of it.

Mr. ALLEN. The power is not inherent in the Government?

Mr. FORAKER. I think the power is inherent in every sovereignty to take care of itself and have an army. The Constitution provides how an army shall be authorized and how it shall be organized.

Mr. ALLEN. Let me put it to the Senator as a lawyer. Is the power inherent in the absence of a grant power?

Mr. FORAKER. That is owing to what kind of a government you have. In our Government all powers are derived from the people. We heard that during the campaign—"all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed."

Mr. ALLEN. I know that.

Mr. FORAKER. We settled that at the polls.

Mr. ALLEN. I am speaking now in a constitutional sense and with reference to this Government.

Mr. FORAKER. Yes.

Mr. ALLEN. But for the express grant of power, would that power exist?

Mr. FORAKER. I think the Government would have a right to have an army and protect its life, even if the Constitution had been silent on the subject.

Mr. ALLEN. I am calling for a distinct answer. I have recognized in a general sense that the right of self-preservation is inherent in nations as well as in individuals. If this is a grant of power, which I suppose the Senator will not deny in the light of our constitutional history—

Mr. FORAKER. What I say about that in answer to the Senator is that the power to make war is a power inherent in every sovereignty. It is impossible to conceive of a sovereign power without that power having the power to make war, and the Constitution of the United States only provides how the war power shall be exercised. It confers upon Congress the power to raise and support armies.

Mr. ALLEN. Those questions have never been passed upon at all. I beg pardon of the Senator from Georgia if I have occupied too much time.

Mr. FORAKER. I am content to follow the legislative precedents. They do not seem to me to be in violation of the Constitution or to have been unwise.

Mr. ALLEN. I would agree with the Senator in a qualified sense, but not in the broad sense in which he puts it; but if it be true that this is a grant of power, then has Congress the right to delegate that power to any other department of the Government?

Mr. FORAKER. Congress is not delegating any power. Congress is simply exercising its own power in passing the bill now under consideration, as it has time and again exercised its power in all the instances to which we have called attention. Congress did not delegate its power to the President of the United States when it said, in 1779, in contemplation of war with France, that the President might increase the Army which the Congress authorized. Neither did Congress delegate its power when it made similar provisions in 1846, when we were threatened by war with Mexico. Neither did Congress delegate its power when we made precisely the provision we are now making in 1866, when there was no threat of war, but only a promise of peace.

Mr. BACON. Mr. President, that was rather a long interruption, in which the Senator has failed to carry out the promise he made that he intended to ask me a question. He said he desired to predicate his question upon some remarks which he has made. He made the remarks, but I have not heard the question. I understand what the Senator meant to imply, however.

Mr. FORAKER. I beg the Senator's pardon. I do not think I said I rose to ask him a question.

Mr. BACON. That is all right.

Mr. FORAKER. I stated that before he turned away from what he was discussing—namely, this legislation—to speak about the last election, I wanted to call his attention to a statute which evidently he had overlooked, and that I wanted the privilege of predicated some remarks upon it as to what I understood to be his position, so as to show the application of what I proposed to read.

Mr. BACON. To which I made no objection and no interruption.

Mr. FORAKER. No; the Senator very courteously, as he always does, yielded that I might do so. I did not understand that he understood that I was going to ask him a question.

Mr. BACON. The question as to whether or not the former statutes conferred the same power that is now sought to be conferred in the sense in which I am discussing it, as a continuing power, outside of whether or not the increase for a particular emergency was constitutional, but a continuing power which should put away from the Congress the performance of its own obligation—I say still there is no statute that I have seen, not even that which is now cited by the Senator from Ohio, which goes to that extent.

I want to add, as that reminds me of it, that it is not simply the putting away of a power which may be resumed, but it is the putting away of a power which may not be resumed. Senators have said that it was altogether in the power of Congress to control the question of the exercise by the President of the power of increasing the Army by the limitation of the appropriation, and that every two years a new Congress is elected. Yet Senators know the fact that there might be an utter revolution in the country which would turn out the dominant party from control of the representative branch of Congress and put in it a large majority of those opposed to this legislation, and nevertheless as the Senate is constituted they could not practically enforce their wishes because this Senate, by reason of its present membership and the length of service, is known to be such that within the next four years it can not be changed so as to overturn the party which is now controlling it. Therefore, when you pass this bill, you put upon the statute books a law which can not be changed unless all three of the branches of the legislative department, to wit, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President in the exercise of the veto power, shall be also changed.

Mr. President, the act of 1850, to which the Senator from Ohio has alluded, and which he has cited, while it does go further than the other acts which have heretofore been cited, was evidently animated by the same purpose and due to the recognition of the same necessities.

It was at a time when our great West was unpeopled, when access to it was by very limited and slow methods of transportation, when there were no telegraph wires there, and when an army might be necessary for quick action in the midst, as there then were, of great vast numbers of hostile Indians, without the opportunity for Congress to be promptly called together; and the act expressly, in specifying the circumstances under which the troops may be enlisted, limits such enlistments to "existing regiments of the Army, at present serving, or which may hereafter serve, at the several military posts on the western frontier"—not all the troops of the United States Army by all means—"and at remote and distant stations."

The act limits the power especially and specifically to them, it being designed for an emergency which might arise under circumstances where it would be impossible for Congress to be assembled in time to provide against it. They were evidently influenced by the same reasons that influenced them in the acts of 1799 and 1815 and 1846.

I should not be frank if I did not say that the act of 1866 did go further. It does go further, but even the phraseology of it indicates that the Congress still had in view the necessities on the western frontier, where the population was still scarce and where the methods of communication were still slow, and where emergencies were naturally to be expected, and of a sudden character, which would make it impossible that Congress could be assembled in time to provide against them. But this bill does not rest upon any such basis.

This bill proposes that which shall be the permanent organization of the Army of the United States, and is designed to meet an altogether different condition of affairs. It is designed to establish, as the permanent policy of the Government, the exercise by the Executive of a power to put into the field 50,000 men by an increase of the Regular Army to that extent whenever he shall deem it proper to do so, and to dismiss them whenever he shall see proper, and to again enlist them, and to repeat the operation as often as he may see fit.

I repeat, Mr. President, there is no line or letter upon the statute book which is a parallel to such an investment of power in the Executive. I can say it would be uncandid in me to contend that the act of 1866 did not go further than the other acts. It did; but even if it had gone to the full extent of this proposed law, that would not change the legal question as to what is the power of Congress in the raising of armies, whether that is a power laid upon it by the Constitution which it is under obligation to discharge, or whether it can delegate it practically, not as to a few straggling recruits, but as to a great army of 50,000 men, to the Executive.

If an act is unconstitutional it can not as a precedent make constitutional a subsequent act of the same character. If it could do so, Congress could by successive unconstitutional enactments in time entirely legislate away the entire Constitution. So that the question remains, Is this proposed act constitutional?

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. SCOTT] asked me a question which I promised to answer, and that was as to whether or not the American people had not in the last election passed upon this question of an army of 100,000 men. I do not think that they did. I do not think, Mr. President, that the American people passed upon the question of the creation of a Regular Army of 100,000 men, nor do I think they passed upon the question whether or not this country should be converted from a free Republic into an imperialistic government, holding colonies outside of the Constitution of the United States; because, Mr. President, the dominant party which succeeded in that election studiously avoided those issues and studiously endeavored to make the American people believe that they were not involved in the contest.

They took advantage of what proved to be serious mistakes of a political character committed by those with whom they had to contend, and they made the most of them in the most skillful manner. They won the election upon those issues and not upon the ones to which I have alluded. They won the election upon the financial issue. Does anybody doubt that? They won the election upon the financial issue, an issue that really was not in the campaign, because conditions had changed utterly, and there remained no longer anything practical in that issue. In that issue what was true in 1896 was no longer true in 1900. And yet they placed their line of battle upon the same line that they had occupied four years before. They were very skillful in doing it. They took advantage of the mistake of their political opponents. They won the fight, as the Senator from Ohio [Mr. HANNA] knows, on the financial question and a full dinner pail, and they did not win it—

Mr. HANNA. Will the Senator allow me an interruption—

Mr. BACON. Certainly.

Mr. HANNA. As he appeals to me, I suppose he meant me?

Mr. BACON. Yes; of course.

Mr. HANNA. He spoke as to the line of battle adopted by the Republican party in the last election.

Mr. BACON. I paid the Senator a compliment in that connection.

Mr. HANNA. Every issue that was made by the Kansas City convention was met and disposed of, beginning with the Philippine question, and they themselves had ignored and put aside the financial question until the people demanded that the whole question should be considered.

Mr. BACON. I do not know whether the Senator was properly quoted or not at the time when he made that meteoric and brilliant oratorical tour through the West. The newspapers quoted him repeatedly as saying that there was no issue of imperialism in the campaign. I suppose they misrepresented him.

Mr. HANNA. I did not hear the question asked, and the question of imperialism was not urged.

Mr. BACON. I beg the Senator's pardon; I did not hear him.

Mr. HANNA. The question of imperialism was not the question. The question was whether the policy of the Administration up to that time should be supported by the American people. That was the question, and it was pretty well supported on that side.

Mr. BACON. I recur, even on that statement of the distinguished and eloquent Senator, to the statement I made that the issue of imperialism was not passed on by the American people, because the Senator himself, from the rear platform of a train of cars on which he was transported all over the country, repeatedly, if the newspapers properly represented him, stated that there was no such issue of imperialism.

Mr. HANNA. I beg to correct the Senator, if he will allow me. If I said anything upon that subject directly, it was that there was no such thing and could not be any such thing as imperialism—

Mr. BACON. Of course, the Senator did say that.

Mr. HANNA. In the United States—

Mr. BACON. And could not be, therefore, Mr. President—

Mr. HANNA. And that the cry proposed by the party on the other side was simply a fake. That is what I said.

Mr. BACON. I am glad the Senator substantiates what I say. I say, Mr. President, that in the campaign there was no judgment pronounced by the American people upon the issue of imperialism, because the Senator from Ohio, the very astute and able leader of his party, and who certainly achieved a most signal victory, not only said that there was no such thing, but that there could not be any such issue. Well, if there was not any such issue and could not be any such issue, how could the American people pass on it? Therefore I contend that they did not pass on it.

Now, as to this issue of imperialism, I simply brought that in in connection with my reply to the inquiry of the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. SCOTT]. In the same way, Mr. President, there was no issue made as to the Army of 100,000 men. I am speaking about a Regular Army. On the contrary, the constant outgivings of the leaders of the Republican party during the campaign was that there was no intention to have an act passed for a Regular Army of 100,000 men, but that it was simply to be temporary in its nature; therefore it was not passed on, Mr. President. This bill does create an Army of 100,000 men of a permanent nature—not of a temporary nature, to be only temporary in the discretion of the President, but to be permanent in his discretion.

Now, Mr. President, suppose it had been the naked issue. Suppose there had been no other issue in the campaign but the issue whether or not this bill should be the law. Suppose there was nothing else, that every other issue had been left out and not in the minds of the people and not in the mouths of the speakers, and it had been a square fight before the American people whether or not the Regular Army should be increased to the amount of 100,000 men or whether it should be maintained at a figure, say, of 35,000, as is provided by the bill we passed here last session, which way would the American people have determined it?

I have not a doubt as to what they would have done. It is not according to the spirit of the American people, it is not according to the wishes of the great masses of the people, that we should have a great standing army. I wish we could have had an issue squarely on the question of imperialism and the question of a standing army of 100,000 men. If we had had, with all of the astuteness and with all of the ability of the distinguished Senator from Ohio and the very learned and able coadjutors whom he had in that contest, I think the result would have been different.

How many of the laboring men who were influenced by the argument of the full dinner pail favor the creation of a vast regular army which will be a menace to them? How many men were there in the last election who are opposed to this imperialistic policy who lost sight of everything except the ghost of a financial



issue which had been inopportune summoned from the recesses of the past?

The Republican party were afraid to trust the American people on the issue of imperialism and its inevitable inseparable companion, a vast standing regular army.

The burdens and the sacrifices which imperialism and militarism will impose and continue to press upon the people will make them the live issues of the future.

Mr. PROCTOR. I move to lay the amendment on the table.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Vermont moves to lay the amendment of the Senator from Georgia on the table.

Mr. TELLER and Mr. BACON called for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and the Secretary proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROCTOR (when Mr. DILLINGHAM's name was called). On this vote I understand that my colleague [Mr. DILLINGHAM] is paired with the Senator from Florida [Mr. MALLORY].

Mr. McENERY (when his name was called). I am paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. CHANDLER]. I understand that he would vote "yea," and I will therefore vote. I vote "yea."

Mr. MALLORY (when his name was called). I am paired with the junior Senator from Vermont [Mr. DILLINGHAM]. If he were present, I should vote "nay."

Mr. MONEY (when his name was called). I am paired with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. McBRIDE]. I do not know how he would vote. If he were present, I should vote "nay."

Mr. VEST (when his name was called). I inquire whether the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. ALDRICH] has voted?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is informed that he has not voted.

Mr. VEST. I am paired with that Senator. If he were present, I should vote "nay."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. MONEY. My colleague [Mr. SULLIVAN] is absent. I do not know how he would vote. He is paired with the Senator from Illinois [Mr. MASON].

Mr. CHILTON. I inquire if the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. ELKINS] has voted?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is informed that he has not voted.

Mr. CHILTON. I have a general pair with that Senator. In his absence I withhold my vote.

Mr. BACON (after having voted in the negative). The junior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. WETMORE] has not voted, and in his absence I must withdraw my vote, as I have a general pair with him.

The result was announced—yeas 39, nays 20; as follows:

#### YEAS—39.

Allison,	Gallinger,	McENERY,	Quarles,
Bard,	Hanna,	McLaurin,	Scott,
Burrows,	Hansbrough,	McMillan,	Sewell,
Carter,	Hawley,	Morgan,	Shoup,
Clark,	Kean,	Nelson,	Spooner,
Dolliver,	Kyle,	Perkins,	Stewart,
Fairbanks,	Lindsay,	Platt, Conn.	Thurston,
Foraker,	Lodge,	Platt, N. Y.	Warren,
Foster,	McComas,	Pritchard,	Wolcott.
Frye,	McCumber,	Proctor,	

#### NAYS—20.

Allen,	Clay,	Reitfeld,	Talafarro,
Bate,	Cockrell,	Jones, Ark.	Teller,
Berry,	Culberson,	Pettigrew,	Towne,
Butler,	Daniel,	Pettus,	Turley,
Caffery,	Harris,	Rawlins,	Turner.

#### NOT VOTING—27.

Aldrich,	Deboe,	Kenney,	Simon,
Bacon,	Depew,	McBride,	Sullivan,
Baker,	Dillingham,	Mallory,	Tillman,
Beveridge,	Elkins,	Martin,	Vest,
Chandler,	Hale,	Mason,	Wellington,
Chilton,	Hoar,	Money,	Wetmore.
Cullom,	Jones, Nev.	Penrose,	

So Mr. BACON's amendment was laid on the table.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado [Mr. TELLER].

Mr. TELLER. Let the amendment be read.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be read.

The SECRETARY. Amend section 29, page 41, by striking out the words "has been," in line 21, and inserting "shall be hereafter."

Mr. TELLER. That may lie over. There will probably be some arrangement made about it. I do not want a vote on it now.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment, without objection, will be passed by for the present. The Chair lays before the Senate the following amendment—

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President, I know very well that nothing

is accomplished in the way of defeating this bill by further discussion, but we each and all have a duty to perform, and I do not believe I would discharge mine unless I objected to the bill in a very brief way to-night.

This is a bill to create in the United States an army of 100,000 men in time of peace. It is not worth while for any Senator at this time to insist that such is not the fact. That there is an emergency and need for troops in the Philippine Islands everybody probably admits, but if there was peace there this bill would have been introduced and the bill would have been supported, though perhaps on a different pretense and with different arguments from those which have been used with reference to it.

I wish to say to the Senators who have the bill in charge, who have said it was not a bill to increase the Army because the Army is now 100,000 men, that they deceive nobody by such a subterfuge, nor do they deceive the country when they say that the President of the United States will reduce this Army to 54,000 men. They know that the President of the United States is in favor of an army of 100,000 men. He so said in time of profound peace. When there was no hand raised against our flag, and when he had no right or reason to suppose there would be, he said that he wanted an army of 100,000 men. A Republican House of Representatives, by a vote that included every Republican except six, voted in favor of an army of 100,000 men in time of peace. It was not possible then to pretend that there was an emergency; it was not possible to give some excuse why you wanted an army of 100,000 men because of some émeute or difficulty somewhere.

That bill came to us. It was not pressed. There was a vote here that would have defeated it if it had been taken. At the last session no effort was made to pass a hundred thousand Army bill. There was an election coming on, and they did not want to pass an Army bill at that time of this character. We passed a bill and sent it over to the House for 18,000 additional troops. Nobody then pretended that there was any emergency. We had passed in the spring of 1899 a bill that we were told would be sufficient to quiet the disturbance in the Philippines, and we had limited the number of men in the bill to 65,000 regulars and 35,000 volunteers. We had restricted that number to the amount necessary, and then we provided that on the 1st of July coming the entire force should be reduced to what had been the peace footing in this country for many years.

So I say now, Mr. President, this is an army not for this emergency. This is an army of 100,000 men in time of peace, and that is the policy of this Administration and of this Republican party.

Mr. President, when this bill came first before the Senate I recognized that there was a condition in the Philippine Islands that required more than the usual number of men. We were told by the senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SEWELL] that the rebellion was rife and that there was then more difficulty than there had been at any time in that section of country, and we had then 76,000 men there. It turned out, I believe, that we had 71,000 men there, and we have over 71,000 men there now.

If this army of 100,000 were to be created for this exigency or emergency, for the sake of compelling peace in the Philippine Islands, the friends of this measure, those who have it in charge, would have readily acquiesced in the suggestions we have made and the motions we have made, that have been voted down, to reduce the Army to the old complement when peace should be restored in the Philippine Islands. The Senator who has this bill in charge, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, has declared that this army is not a large army in time of peace. So, I believe, have three or four other Senators on the floor of the Senate. They have made such utterances in private conversation; and still more of them have declared that this is a small and not a great army.

So I want to make that clear. If there is any intention on the part of any member of this Senate who represents the dominant party now in power to reduce the Army when peace comes in the Philippine Islands, if it ever shall come, to 54,000, or any other smaller number, I wish they would take some steps to secure that desirable result. But they have not and they will not, and we are now about to enter upon a system which has never been in vogue in this country, one which has been repudiated by the party now in power, and one which is contrary to republican sentiment and inconsistent with free government. We are to have no more volunteers in the future, but we are to maintain a standing army great enough to fight the battles of the Government of the United States whenever there is necessity for an army.

There has been much discussion over the question whether we are abdicating our power. When we said that the Army should consist of 54,000 men, or something like that, and then authorized the President of the United States to fill up and maintain the Army—for that is what we do—the answer to that question has been by everybody who has spoken on the Republican side of the Chamber that we could not abdicate our power over the Army.

They say it is not an abdication of power, because the power still remains with us; which everybody knows and which nobody would deny.

I do not intend to discuss the constitutional question. I know it has been discussed before, and it probably will be discussed again; but I do want to say just a few words as to the nature of legislation of this kind; and I think I can find a ready response in the minds of Senators who insist that it is constitutional to legislate in this way when I say that is vicious legislation, which ought not to be enacted unless when the country is in an hour of peril.

I have pretty liberal views as to the power of the Government and the power of the Executive for the time being, when Congress can not be assembled, to take care of and protect the great interests of the country; but we now live in an age when every Senator can be summoned from his home and come here within five or six days—a very different condition from that which existed in 1779, and from that which existed in 1855. So if there was then some excuse for that kind of legislation, there is no excuse for it now unless, as the Senator from Connecticut appears to think, it is better to intrust power to one man than it is to hold it in the hands of the representatives of the States and the representatives of the people of the United States.

Mr. HAWLEY. Did I ever say so?

Mr. TELLER. I am not speaking of the Senator who sits near me [Mr. HAWLEY], but I am speaking of his colleague [Mr. PLATT of Connecticut], who made an argument the other day to show that there was no possible danger in trusting power to the President of the United States, because up to this hour for a hundred years we have never had a President who would abuse the power if it were intrusted to him.

Mr. President, that is always the argument for unlimited and unrestricted power. That is the argument of those who deny the power of the people to put constitutional limits upon their rulers, and it is rather surprising to hear such statements in this Chamber.

It is possible that we do not abandon our rights and abdicate our powers when we reserve to ourselves, as the Constitution does reserve, the right to repeal any act passed here. Mr. President, I have never heard before in this Chamber when a bad bill was presented and somebody objected to it that you could pass it because you had the power to repeal it. That is all there is in this argument, that when the President of the United States abuses such a power we have got the right to say to him, "You may go just so far, you may reach this point, but you must not go any farther." That might do for a town meeting or a caucus, but I do not think the people of the United States will believe that that is a sound argument in this body. At all events it does not commend itself to me.

When a Senator gets up here and says it is unwise to put such a power in the hands of the Executive, it is not an answer for another Senator to say, "There has never been a President who has abused the power, and if one should abuse it we have it in our power to prevent a continued abuse of it."

Why, Mr. President, the restrictions that are put upon power, and the limitations that are put on the exercise of unlimited power, are not imposed for good men, but for bad men. Unrestricted power is tyranny, whether it be exercised or not. It is contrary to the principles of a free government that there should not be limitations of some kind upon executive acts.

So the question comes whether this is a legislative act or whether it is an executive act. I say this is a legislative act. We raise the Army; we provide for it. I will not deny but that we might authorize the President in a great emergency, perhaps, to go beyond what was the ordinary Army, and that he might properly exercise that power; but I say it is not good policy to do it. It is the wisest thing in the world in a Government like ours to keep as near to the line of restriction upon power as it is possible to do, yet if, in the exigencies of life and in the history of a nation, there should come a time when the ruler of the nation must do what in most cases might be regarded as an abuse, that should not be made a precedent and a principle.

I think I have said all I care to say on that subject, because I do not intend to spend much time on this question. I know upon what dull ears falls everything that is said here against this bill. I know that this is a caucus measure. I do not mean to say that there has been a caucus held on it, because I do not know as to that; but I mean to say it is a Republican measure, and it is to be supported and defended by the members of the Republican party here, with perhaps one or two exceptions.

Mr. President, when the time comes, as it will come, when this Army has been inflicted upon the people, and the same agencies want 100,000 more added to it, you will hear the same argument you have heard here, and you will find the same defenders that you find here to-day. They will tell you that a great nation like ours can afford a great army. Then they will recite how many posts we have got and how many places we have got to garrison, and then somebody, like the chairman of the Committee on Mili-

tary Affairs, will tell us that there are rumors or signs or portents of war against us somewhere.

Mr. HAWLEY. Is the Senator not perfectly aware that, standing right here, I repudiated that statement?

Mr. TELLER. I do not care whether you did or not.

Mr. HAWLEY. I know you do not.

Mr. TELLER. I have got it right here, and I am going to read it; and that is exactly what the Senator said.

Mr. HAWLEY. I spoke of what was always indefinitely in the air.

Mr. TELLER. Very well.

Mr. HAWLEY. The Senator understood me, but he will not say so.

Mr. TELLER. I did understand the Senator; and I understood him to say what I have stated. I was here when he said it, and I have the extract from his speech, but I can not put my hands on it at the moment.

Mr. HAWLEY. I will repeat what I said if the Senator wishes me to do so.

Mr. TELLER. The Senator said that we needed an army for the purpose of keeping peace in certain sections where there are anarchists. He used words to that effect, and then he added what I have stated about the feeling as to our taking the Danish Islands, etc. The newspapers of the country took up that statement and used it. There is not anybody in the United States who believes that there would be any danger of a foreign war if we should buy all the West India Islands, with the South Sea Islands thrown into the bargain. Who is going to complain if we buy the Danish Islands? What nation is going to raise its hand against us?

Mr. President, we do not want this great army of 100,000 men to resist any threatened or apprehended war from any people in the world. When we shall have secured peace in the Philippines—which God knows we ought to do, and do speedily—we shall not need more than thirty or forty thousand men, even if we garrison every post in the United States with a full complement of men. We could not swell the number above 50,000 even if we leave five or six thousand in Cuba.

How long are our soldiers to remain in Cuba? Everybody knows that we are under a pledge to mankind, a pledge that if we had not made we would have had an army of not 6,000 in Cuba, but an army such as we now have in the Philippine Islands, or else we should have been compelled to withdraw from Cuba. The people of Cuba would have fought us as the Filipinos are fighting us if we had not pledged ourselves to the world that we would surrender to them the control of their own national affairs.

There is a constitutional convention now in session in Cuba. I have a letter, received to-day, from the general in command there, in which he says that peace and order prevail. They had two elections in the island of Cuba, one a municipal election and one an election for members of the constitutional convention; and I have the authority of the commanding general there that not an émeute arose anywhere on the days of either of those elections. Nobody in the island of Cuba assaulted, or attempted to assault, any other man on the day of either of those elections. There are very few cities in this Union where that can be said of the last election. It can not be said of the great cities in this country, as it can be said of Habana. It can not be said of the city of Philadelphia, where they had a great force of policemen, not to see that the people voted, but to see that they did not vote, if a former member of this Senate does not testify falsely against the condition that then existed.

Mr. President, you do not need an army in Cuba. You can withdraw that army to-morrow and peace and order will prevail. I heard one of our generals before the Committee on Relations with Cuba last winter say to that committee, "I presided over a district containing 500,000 inhabitants—the Matanzas district." I refer to General Wilson, than whom there is no better officer in the public service to-day. He said to us, "You can not find anywhere in the United States 500,000 people better qualified to maintain a government than those people. Nowhere can you find 500,000 men more obedient to law and more observant of the rights of other men than in the Matanzas district." You are not going to need an army in Cuba, and if you need an army in the Philippines now, it is to be hoped that you will not need it there always.

Nobody has objected here—and I want to make that plain—to the size of the army which the President says he needs for the purpose of putting down what the Senator sitting at my right [Mr. HAWLEY] calls "the traitors to this country." I presented a petition here the other day of 2,000 men. I do not know their relation to this Government. I do not believe they are citizens of it; I hope not; I never want to see them citizens of it. But the right of petition exists to every man living where the American flag floats, and that right would have been denied them here if it could have been denied after the reading of that petition had begun.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART] tells us to-day that those men are in arms against the Government of the United



States. Not a man of them was ever so in arms. They are the orderly, law-abiding citizens of Manila. In that list are distinguished lawyers, judges, professors in colleges, and other representative men. You may deny to those people the right to have that petition printed as a document, but we have had it read here and the American people will read it, whether you smother it in committee or whether you do not.

I did not agree when I presented the petition that I indorsed everything said in it, but I remember that the right of petition is the dearest right of a freeman; I remember that the denial of that right was enough to bring our forefathers into hostility with Great Britain. I recall the words of Patrick Henry as to the attempt of the colonies to petition and the refusal of the King to receive it—not a worse king than most kings, but infinitely better than some of his predecessors and some of his successors. I am going to read the language of Patrick Henry, and I know he expressed the sentiments of the Senator from Connecticut, who arraigned those people as traitors, and I suppose he arraigns me as a traitor.

Before I read this language I wish to say that I hold the right of petition to be one that can not be alienated or destroyed, and that you can not put any restriction on it here, if we are to continue to have a free Government. I remember that John Quincy Adams presented in the House of Representatives a petition for the dissolution of the Union, and I remember that there was a great tirade made against him, and that he defended himself. Every man who has studied the proper forms of government and knows what is necessary to maintain liberty knows that the right of petition can not be determined upon what the petitioner says he wants. These men say to us, "We want you to take off your hard and heavy hand; we want you to do it because we believe it is for your interest and for ours." They are not traitors; neither am I a traitor when I present the petition.

In the house of burgesses of Virginia, March 23, 1775, Patrick Henry said:

Sir, we have done everything that could be done to avert the storm that is now coming on. We have petitioned, we have remonstrated, we have supplicated, we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded, and we have been spurned with contempt from the foot of the throne.

It is too late in the United States to deny any man the right of petition. It is true that we have a provision in our statutes that if the petitioners are foreigners their petition must come through the State Department, which is, however, a recognition of the right of the foreigner to petition us if he so chooses. But these people have nobody in the State Department to speak for them. If they are citizens, they are citizens without the right of citizenship. Nobody represents them here. Nobody has a right to represent them, perhaps, under the present condition of things; but they have a right to supplicate, to petition; and, Mr. President, they will always be heard when they come here. I should regret to believe that the time would ever come when a petitioner against what he believes to be wrongs and injustice of this Government could not come here with a full knowledge that his petition, if not granted, at least would receive respectful consideration.

Mr. President, you do not want this Army for the Philippine Islands. If you do, it is not enough. You have got 71,000 men over there now; you have 420 stations there; and if you put 300 men to a station it will be little enough; in fact, it will be too small. If you are to control that country by power and by force, you must have many thousands more than you can possibly spare under this bill.

We hope, Mr. President, that the condition existing over there will be speedily brought to a close. A few days since I was talking with an Army officer, high in the public service, a man who has rendered great service to the Government of the United States, a man whom the people of the United States respect and admire. He said to me, "I believe the affairs over there can be composed, if rightly approached, in the next thirty days;" but they will not be so approached and no proper effort will be made to that end.

When the last commission went over to the Philippines we thought it was sent there not to legislate; not to adjudicate and render judicial decisions; not to fix a tariff; not to say what articles should be admitted and what should be excluded from their ports; not to appoint specially a collector of the port here or there; but we thought the commission had been sent there to bring about, if possible, an era of peace. Mr. President, so far as I can learn, that commission has never made any effort in that direction. If the President of the United States has granted amnesty, as it is said he has, that amnesty has expired.

For myself, I do not believe, Mr. President, that those people are rebels against the United States in the sense in which we speak of people who rebel against an established government to which they owe allegiance. Neither do I believe that they are traitors. They may be mistaken; they may believe that this Gov-

ernment is going to give to them what is denied here; yet, as I said the other day—and I repeat it—they have every reason under the sun to believe it, and no reason on the face of the earth to believe that we intend to give them the blessings of a free government. The autocratic power which they see exercised every day is not encouraging. They know that upon our Calendar is a bill coming from the proper committee of the body with its approval, or at least with the approval of the Republican members of that committee, which provides that when peace shall come, when there shall be no more war over there, then the President of the United States shall create such a government as he sees fit; but in it there is no promise; there is no suggestion that those people are to have any part or lot in the government under which they are to live.

I regard our condition in the Philippine Islands as extremely unfortunate. It is a difficult thing to deal with, and I do not myself know how the Government proposes to deal with it. I hear sometimes about the policy of the Government over there. The only policy that I know anything about is the policy of force. The only policy that I have heard advocated here is a policy of submission on their part without any pledges or without any promises on ours. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. BERRY] put in the RECORD yesterday an amendment which he proposes to this bill, which shall declare to them what we declared to Cuba. I venture the prediction here that every Republican in this Chamber, save and except two or three, will vote against it. That, then, is not the policy the Government is to pursue in dealing with them.

I do not want to misrepresent the chairman of this committee. He and I have sat side by side for many years, and he and I do not agree, and we do not agree on fundamentals. He can not agree with me and I can not agree with him, and neither of us, perhaps, is very lenient and tender toward the opinion of the other when it comes in conflict with our well-established opinion. I wish to show that I did not misrepresent him. He goes on to say:

"And the enlisted force of the line of the Army shall be reduced to the number as provided for by a law," as referred to there, an old law bringing it down to about 26,000 or 27,000 men; but with the addition of 1,500 or 2,000 men (the figures are here given) in those two artillery regiments, we call it roughly 29,000 men.

Now, that is certainly not more than what would be a sufficient guard for our own country. There are places where we know we have to keep people—

Of course, he meant the Army—

because we are in danger of anarchistic and revolutionary and insurrectionary outbreaks, and our men are scattered throughout the country, after a great deal of study as to where it is worth while to put 500 men or where to put a thousand men. It is not a matter of random at all.

We are not altogether out of sight of some possibility of war yet with some European power. We do not know. They are in a great deal of trouble there, and I understand they look with very great jealousy upon our talk of a Danish island and our talk about acquiring other territory.

I can not conceive that the Senator did not have some threatened difficulty in sight, and yet I have not been able myself to see it. I have looked the world over. I know that we are not particularly loved in Europe. I know, as the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] said, that our competition in trade is creating a great feeling against us over there, but I fail to see any nation in the world that is going to attack us in the interest of trade. I recall that very many, many years ago, when this nation was not so homogeneous as it is now, when we had a North and a South, which now we have obliterated, that Abraham Lincoln made a speech in the State of Illinois. It was years before he came into prominence, and he spoke to the people of that State upon the strength of the Government of the United States and its immunity from foreign aggression and foreign attack. He used an expression which I thought was characteristic of that great mind. He said:

If we are united, all the powers of the world can not take a drink of water out of the Ohio River; all the powers of the world can not make a track on the Blue Ridge.

I say that to-day. If we have any war, it will be a war upon the sea. It will not be a war upon the land. With 76,000,000 people, compact, homogeneous, attached to their country, we may defy all the powers of the world. How could they bring their troops across the sea and land them on our shores? How soon would we drive them into the sea? Oh, Mr. President, those who picture any such impossible condition are doing injustice to the nation and injustice to themselves. Nobody will attack a nation that can put a million people into the field at once. No nation is going to attack another that has more endurance and more wealth than any three great powers that can be named. It is an idle thing. As the Senator said of the fear of a great army, it is a delusion.

I wish to say that my opposition to this bill is not because I think a hundred thousand men can destroy the liberties of this country, nor five hundred thousand, but because it establishes a principle contrary to a republican principle, which is that the fighting force of a republic is the great body of the people, and not a paid soldiery, called "regulars."

I am going back to the beginning. When this debate opened I asked the Senators here to tell me why they wanted an army in



time of peace, and what I have read is the answer we got from the Senator from Connecticut. Nobody else has pretended to answer it, that I know of. If we say we are rich enough to have it, I will agree to that. There is no nation in the world that can maintain so large an army as we can, and maintain it so easily; and yet there is no reason in the world why we should maintain an army for a single hour longer than there is necessity for it. Not long since, a few months ago, the Czar of Russia, realizing that the great armies of Europe were not only a drag upon the industries, but a weight upon the aspirations and hopes of the people, asked the world to get together and arrange for disarmament; and we sent our representatives over to The Hague, and the world sent theirs. But when they got there they did nothing.

Since the birth of the world, in all history, there has never been a time when the people were so pressed down and burdened by great armies and great army expenses as they are to-day. There are bigger armies now than when Napoleon fought the world. They are not in active service, but they are a weight upon the industries and upon the productive energies of the people. Russia, a country not rich, has 850,000 men in her army and 3,500,000 that she can bring into the army. England, with 200,000 in her regular army, has now in the neighborhood of 400,000 men in the field. The total expenses for the armies of Europe alone in time of peace is enough to pay our interest-bearing debt every year.

Mr. President, I object to this bill. I object to it as calculated to injure and to destroy the patriotic impulse of the young men of the country, who want to be educated to believe that when there is danger they are the ones to confront it—the young men who should be taught to believe that a man is entitled to go into the Army when his country is assailed. He does not go into the Army for \$15 a month, but he goes into it stimulated by patriotism and not by the hope of gain. You are going to say to all the young men, "You are not needed; it is folly to take an interest in military affairs, for we are going to fight our battles in the future with paid hirelings," whom we pick up frequently out of the very slums of Europe; men who are fighting machines, but are not thinking men.

Mr. President, we had a great army in the field, a million men at one time on our side, and somewhat less on the other. Why were those two armies the best armies in the world that ever aggregated together? Simply because they were the brains and the patriotism of the country. There were, of course, some bounty jumpers and some foreigners, but the great battles were fought by the stalwart sons of American fathers and mothers, and that is where you have to go, unless you are to follow the European system and the European policy with a great standing army.

Look at France. France, with a little more than half the people we have, has five hundred and some odd thousand men in the field, withdrawn from the productive industries, consumers but not producers; and if there is decay in France, if the dead rot has struck her people, it has done so because the people of France have ceased to have the policy that their fathers had, because they have ceased to believe that they are France, and that they are the men who must make France glorious if she ever is. Germany has an equal number or more; and thus you may go over Europe.

We are a great nation, I will admit. We do not want to emulate those countries. There is not any need of it. There is nobody in the world who needs to see a great army in the United States to know that we are the greatest nation under the sun, that we are the greatest people that ever lived in modern times, and I believe I shall not be extravagant if I say, all things considered, the greatest nation that ever lived under the sun. The glory of Rome may have been greater in arms, but in peaceful pursuits, in the condition of our people, in their ability to take care of themselves, their high aspirations, and the high plane upon which they live we have never been excelled by any nation in the world.

I can not see this attempt to put a great army, a useless army, not a harmless army, on the people in time of peace without entering a very vigorous protest against it; and I do not care if you can find the constitutional power to let the President maintain it and decrease it as he chooses. I want to say to you he never will decrease it. He declares that we want 60,000 men in the Philippines, and that we will want them there for a number of years. Do you know what we could do if we would put our Army at a reasonable rate and save this great expense? Suppose we put the Army at forty or forty-five thousand, if that is necessary, or, if you insist upon it, you may go to 50,000 in this calculation which I wish to make.

Now, what is it going to cost to add fifty or sixty thousand or seventy-five thousand men to our Army? If you add in the neighborhood of sixty thousand men, you are morally certain that you will have an additional expense of at least \$60,000,000 a year—not for this year alone, not for next year alone, not for five or ten years, but for an indefinite period. When you have this great Army the agencies that put it into operation to-day will maintain it there. You have not any use for it. If it is a pageant, and for

glory, you do not need it. If it is for defense of any attack that ever shall be made upon us, it is not enough. We can get the soldiers out of the body of the citizens of the United States without this great expense.

You may take what you are to waste upon this Army, what I believe, and what I think the country will believe, is a reasonable number, and you have at least the expenditure of sixty millions a year, and in three years by remaining on a peace basis we might save enough money to build the interoceanic canal. In another three years or a trifle more we might build another canal between New York and the Lakes and open up a country there to pour its great riches and wealth into the channels of commerce, and send them across the sea. You can, with a month and less than a month of it, build a ship canal from the Gulf to the city of Chicago, and in twenty years you can pay our public debt, at least so far as it draws interest.

Now, will some Senator get up here and tell me what you get for this great expenditure—what benefit, what advantage? You put an additional tax upon the country, laboring now under heavy burdens; and our salvation has been for the last two years in the exports trade. Every burden we put upon them renders the production of export articles more difficult. Do you think that somebody will pay this sixty million? No. Every industry in the United States will be taxed for it. Every man will be taxed and every woman. If there was peril ahead of us, if there were need of it, we would pay those taxes as cheerfully as we paid our taxes during the late civil war, when the Government put upon us a 10 per cent income tax.

But I challenge the chairman of this committee or the Senator from Vermont to show the necessity for this increase unless, as suggested by the Senator from Connecticut, we are to keep down anarchists and revolutionists. Where are they? In what portion of the country do you need an army, and how long has it been since peace and order in the United States had to be maintained by a great army? It is contrary to every theory of this Government. The States maintain order and peace, and it is only when a revolution gets so great that the State can not that the Government must. We have had an army big enough for any difficulty that came.

We have fought our battles, not with the Regular Army, but with the volunteers. The great battles of the revolution were fought by humble men of the country who were not regulars. The war of 1812, as will be discovered if anybody will take the pains to look, was won by volunteers, and the Mexican war was fought by volunteers and not by the regulars. The most glorious battles in the world, where the greatest heroism has been exhibited, where the greatest conflicts between men have taken place, have been fought, not by regulars, but by volunteers. It was the boys out of the shop, with the exception of the Old Guard, that fought for Napoleon on many a bloody battlefield. It was not the regulars. He called upon the French people and they responded.

Such has been the case in England. Such is the case with every liberty-loving people. You must rely upon the people, not upon an army. An army is a vain delusion. It may to-day be for you; it may be against you to-morrow. I recall many instances in the history of the world, as Senators will, where an army became a source of disquietude and where the destruction of the government was due to the army. It is possible and probable that a hundred thousand men can not do that here, but if you want to rely upon an army to maintain peace you must rely first upon the volunteers of the States, and then if the trouble becomes great enough you may rely upon the volunteers of this great Government of ours.

Mr. President, they tell us you can not get an army quickly. Let anyone take Mr. Stanton's report which he made to Congress at the close of the late war and see what he says about the volunteer. He was high in his praise. There were no regulars anywhere. They were all volunteers. They say you can not get them quickly. In 1864, when there was a good deal of doubt as to the result of the conflict between our brothers in the South and ourselves, the governor of Ohio, the governor of Illinois, the governor of Indiana, the governor of Iowa, and the governor of Wisconsin met together in this city, and the Government said to them, "We want troops, and we want them now. We are getting troops by the usual method of selection—by enlistment. We want a hundred and twenty thousand men;" and they parceled them out and said, "We will give you a hundred and twenty thousand men." The Government said, "When; in how long a time?" They said, "We will give them to you in three weeks."

The State of Ohio put into active service 36,000 men inside of three weeks, armed and equipped, as well calculated to fight the battles of our country as any regulars that ever were employed. The Secretary said that those men were largely called out for the purpose of garrisoning, and so forth, and they expected to be in the field only ninety days. He says, however, the men wanted to go to the front, and he sent many of them to the front, and then



he pays a tribute to their bravery and to the success which crowned their efforts.

Mr. ALLEN. Will the Senator permit me to interject a statement. Our civil war proved in a number of instances that the most conspicuous failures were Westpointers.

Mr. TELLER. I will not stop to say much about that; but I have sitting on my right here a civilian soldier, who did great credit to his State and great credit to the nation; and I have sitting on the other side of me a gentleman, who was then a New England youth, who went out, not for the money in it, and who rendered signal service to the Government of the United States as a private until his merit promoted him to a higher place.

Our late war was full, to overflowing, of cases where the volunteer was equal to any trained soldier, and where the volunteer officer was in many cases superior. Was there any man in the Army, unless it was the great chief, General Grant, who rendered more signal service than the Senator from Illinois, now dead, who sat in this Chamber so many years? I recall myself many and many an officer who went down in the strife of battle who was the equal of any man who escaped or of any man who carried the parchment of graduation from Westpoint or any other academy. When we shall rely upon the trained soldier and him only, our decadence will begin, and we shall lose the spirit of patriotism and of aggression.

I do not want to see the spirit of conquest, but I do not want ever to see this nation where the great body of the people will not be ready to resent a national insult with their lives, if necessary. Your machine soldiers will not do that. Your idle camp followers will not do that. You must have men who are stimulated by love of independence and country, who will go out and take their lives in their hands. If I needed to mention an example of the power and strength of the citizen soldiery, I could call your attention to the conquest in South Africa, where people living at home, full of love of liberty, are contending against ten times their number, and so far have not had much the worst of the conflict.

Why do not the British wipe them out? They do not do it because the British soldier is no longer selected from the great body of the yeomanry of that country. The purlieus of the cities and the slums have been searched for the army, and to-day Great Britain, realizing that the strength of the army is not in that class of men, is paying a dollar and a quarter a day to the men who enter her army, a price that has never been paid in the history of that country or any other European country.

Why does she do that? She could with her great wealth call upon all the world. She wants the Britain to do the fighting. She knows that if she could get into her army the class of men she had when she fought Napoleon they would not surrender when 15 or 20 per cent of them were killed, but they would stand up and fight and would not think of surrendering until the great body of the troops had been destroyed. So she says "Come out and do your work for us."

Mr. President, that is the class of men we must rely upon. Now I am going to ask the question, not for myself, not because I expect an answer, but because I want the American people to know that there is not any reason for this army in time of peace. I want the American people to know that if there is an exigency over there we are prepared to meet it. We have offered to do it. We have said, unlimited numbers if you want them, unlimited time if peace does not come, if you want it, but in peace, when war shall cease, we want to rely upon the great body of the American people, and we want a small army, not to put down anarchists, not to put down rebellion, but as a nucleus, when the time comes, if it ever shall come, that we will need a great army we may build it upon it.

Mr. President, I have made no attack upon the character of this reorganization. I do not know whether it is wise or whether it is not. I am inclined to believe that it is too large and somewhat top-heavy if you are to have only 54,000; but if you are going to have 100,000, as I believe you are, then, Mr. President, it is not too heavily officered, in my judgment.

Mr. President, I do not care to continue this discussion. As I said before, I know that it is decreed that this bill shall pass. I know it will pass without reason. I know it will pass without good judgment. I know it will be a sad day for the American people when our Army expenses shall go from \$40,000,000 to \$150,000,000. Some day the American people will find it out. If, as has been said here, the last election settled that you are to have a great army, then I say be courageous and not cowardly as you have been, and stand up here and say we want 100,000 men in peace.

Do not beat about the bush and say when peace comes in the Philippines we are going to put down the Army, and yet refuse to put in the bill any provision which compels its reduction.

Mr. President, I had several things I intended to present to the Senate, and perhaps it would have been better if I had presented them instead of generalizing as I have done. Yet it seems to me

that we only need to say to the American people, to have them see this folly, that no man stands here and gives a good reason why we should have 100,000 men in peace, and all the advocates of the bill attempt to beat about the bush and say this emergency is what we are after.

I repeat, Mr. President, it is the policy of the party now in power to have a great standing army—and God knows why; I do not. It is possible that it has some connection with the change that seems to be taking place in this country. It is not impossible that the cry of imperialism which has been made may have some ground, and, afraid that imperialism will not suit the people, there is preparation for a great army to put down anarchists, revolutionists, and insurrectionists, not in the Philippine Islands, but at home.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President—

Mr. GALLINGER. If the Senator will permit me, I offer an amendment to the pending bill, which I ask may be printed and lie on the table without reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PLATT of Connecticut in the chair). The amendment will lie on the table and be printed. As there is no amendment pending, the Chair will lay before the Senate the amendment intended to be proposed by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN]. It will be stated.

The SECRETARY. On page 38, section 24, line 19, after the word "Army," insert:

And those volunteer officers not over 30 years of age who held commissions during the war with Spain and are now serving in the Regular Army.

Mr. ALLEN. How would the paragraph read if the amendment should be adopted?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is informed that it is proposed to insert this amendment in an amendment which has already been stricken out of the bill, so that it would not be in order.

Mr. ALLEN. The amendment itself as read is not intelligible unless read with the text.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The text of the bill to which the amendment is offered has been stricken out, the Chair is informed, so that it has nothing to attach itself to.

Mr. ALLEN. Then there is nothing left.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN] has the floor.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, I had not intended to take any part in the discussion of this bill. I had neither prepared for nor cared to enter into any general discussion of it. It has seemed to me too plain a case—the necessity of the passage of this bill and at an early date—for Senators to seriously occupy time in contending against it. Time is the essence and important factor if we have in view either economy, the keeping of faith with our soldiers, or the retention of the ground and advantages already gained in the Philippines.

I fear that the bill can not now become a law in time to prevent the expenditure of millions of dollars which could have been saved had we been able to enact a law in the earliest days of our session. Certain it is that because of this delay our cost will be very great if we keep faith with the men who enlisted with the expectation of reaching home by the 1st of July next, according to contract; and the expenditure will be still more enhanced if we maintain anything like our present force in the Philippines while making the exchange.

For instance, we have already brought out a portion of the troops from there without sending any to take their places. To do this we must not only abandon some of the posts and towns we have heretofore occupied, but the natives who, much like the American Indian, judge of the strength of the United States by what is in evidence at the front, will consider that, as our forces decrease just at this trying time, we are weakening; and with hostile natives, opportunity will seem to be at hand for them to retake lost territory.

If the bill should pass to-day, it would be impossible, according to my notion, to transport troops over and bring back those required to return within the time fixed by law, unless we either buy or hire a large addition to our fleet of transports. To buy more would seem to be a great waste, as we can hardly have continuous use for so many; and to hire means practically to buy and yet not own, because we must take vessels now employed in carrying passengers or freight and rig them out for Army transport service. This requires almost a reconstruction of each vessel, and would cost immense sums of money and consume much time.

In hiring such vessels we must pay first for the time the vessel and her crew are at our disposal and in use, including time of fitting up and unfitting; second, for overhauling and putting in all the extras required for transport service; third, for taking the same all out and putting the vessel back into proper condition, so she may continue in her original trade or business.

But, Mr. President, notwithstanding my reluctance to enter



into debate, I can not keep silent in view of some of the suggestions and statements made this afternoon, which, it seems to me, ought not to pass unchallenged—statements that are dogmatic, grossly incorrect, and that I can not permit to go by without notice.

I have failed to hear from anybody on this floor any argument to show that we should not have a standing army. I have not heard any argument or any assertion from anyone that a volunteer army was not a good one. I have not heard any Senator state that the bill seeks to enlarge the Army beyond a maximum that is considered necessary at the present time—100,000 men.

Yet we are asked from time to time why we want a standing army of 54,000 men and why we want a temporary army, if you please, of 50,000 men. We are taunted continually with not having sufficiently answered the question, while with the same breath in which comes the question comes the admission that our present need is 100,000 men in the United States Army.

It appears to me, after listening to all the debate, that we can ask the question, Why not have an army of 100,000 men, as this bill provides? I have not heard any argument here yet why we should not have a regular standing army of 54,000, or why we should not have an army, regular and temporary, of 100,000 at this time.

The proposition, then, is allowed on all sides that we need 100,000 men. Then the only difference can be as to how that army shall be made up. From the other side the proposition comes that we will order an army of 100,000 men; that the President shall not have control over it, so far as enlarging or diminishing it is concerned; and that Congress must meet and deliberate upon it before it can be made smaller or larger, until the end of the period provided for in such act.

On our side the proposition is made that we propose to have a standing army of 54,000, and not 100,000, with the intention to keep it at that figure; but that we will have a regular standing army of 54,000, and we shall have, in addition, a temporary army of the difference between 54,000 and about a hundred thousand, so constituted that not only can the President make it smaller, but Congress can do the same at any time.

I fail to see any advantage in any proposition coming from those who differ with this bill, over what we propose, as to the temporary nature of the Army.

Mr. ALLEN. What do you want to do with it?

Mr. WARREN. I can not see that any argument has been made or evidence offered to maintain the proposition that it is either more economical or safer to make a temporary force, which shall end in two or three years or at some arbitrary time, than to make a temporary force that is within the hands of both the President and Congress, so that during the interim between the meetings of Congress the President can handle it, and reduce the Army if circumstances will admit of it, and Congress, of course, can take it up at any time if it is considered that the President moves too slowly.

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. BACON] stated here this afternoon, dogmatically, that we do not need a Regular Army of 54,000 men. If he made any argument to sustain his assertion I failed to hear it. The Senator from Colorado [Mr. TELLER] says that the present Administration means to make it a regular standing army of 100,000 men, and never reduce it. That is a dogmatic statement also.

I want to say to that Senator, and to every other Senator, that I do not know of a single man in an executive capacity in this Administration, nor do I know anyone who has had connection with framing the pending bill, who has any idea of maintaining a standing army at 100,000.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wyoming yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. WARREN. Certainly.

Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator allow me to suggest to him that in the last two messages the President has recommended 100,000 men, not for this emergency, but as a regular standing army? He will find it if he will look over the messages.

Mr. WARREN. And both the messages have come at a time when we needed 100,000 men, according to the testimony of the Senator from Colorado himself.

Mr. TELLER. If the Senator will allow me, I will state that the first one was in a time, as I said to-day, of profound peace. There was no war or rumors of war or expectation of war. He recommended 100,000; and the Republican House of Representatives was sufficiently in harmony with that suggestion that they passed it through, practically by their full vote.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, will the Senator give me the date on which he says the House passed a bill for an army of 100,000? I assume that the Senator will not say there was any action on the part of either branch of Congress to enlarge the Army to 100,000 before there were difficulties or before there were

signs of difficulty with Spain, because the records will not sustain such an assertion.

Now, when we ask why not have a standing army of 54,000, it may be well to make some comment upon the necessity for it. It seems to me, though, it is enough when the President of the United States in his official capacity says we need it—a man who has served four years as President of the United States, and has just been reelected by an unprecedentedly large popular vote; a man who was one of the bravest of the brave of those civil war volunteer soldiers the Senator from Colorado so eloquently referred to; a man who has been in public life and in Congress for many, many years, and who, on his judgment and on his honor and standing, states that we need this army.

Then take the Secretary of War, who came in from civil life and took his portfolio at a time when he must have been free from all the prejudices which might have surrounded others who had been in the Army; a man who is accorded by everyone to be a man of rare ability, a man of judgment, and a man of honesty. This Secretary of War says we need this army. The present Secretary came into service after we had had several Army bills before us and the matter had been fully discussed.

He proceeded vigorously to do his duty under his oath as Secretary of War, and every member of the Committee on Military Affairs upon this side and upon the other side of this Chamber knows that he has that independence which ignores or accepts, according to circumstances, the former habits and legends of the Army; he differs sometimes with rank and file, with line and field, with general and staff officers, in arriving at his own conclusions.

He comes in here, does this Secretary, after conducting the war in the Philippines and after handling the Army matters here, at home, and elsewhere, insisting that we need this army, and he advises us that 54,000 is less, rather than more, than we need as a standing force, and that 44,000 more are needed during the present exigency.

We have the Commanding General of the Army, a man who has grown gray in the service, and who has served in every war since the beginning of the civil war, and is not one of those despised Westpointers to whom the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. ALLEN] has referred. He recommends even more troops than this bill provides.

Mr. ALLEN. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. WARREN. Certainly.

Mr. ALLEN. I do not desire the Senator to speak in that manner. I have said nothing which would indicate that I despise a Westpointer. Some of the most conspicuous of our soldiers on both sides during the civil war were Westpointers, and some of the most conspicuous failures as commanders—and if it were proper here I could mention names—were Westpointers.

So it is not a question whether a man is a Westpointer. I look over the Republican side and I see conspicuous volunteer soldiers on that side of the Chamber, the eminent chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the eminent soldier, now the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SEWELL], and the eminent Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR], whose superiors as commanders during the civil war were not known, and they are not Westpointers.

Mr. WARREN. I accept the change or the correction.

Mr. ALLEN. There is no change at all. The Senator was simply mistaken, that is all.

Mr. WARREN. Very well, I acknowledge the mistake; but the present General Commanding the Army certainly is not one of those conspicuous failures who came from Westpoint to which the Senator from Nebraska alluded this afternoon.

Mr. ALLEN. No; the present eminent Lieutenant-General is a conspicuous example of the volunteer soldier.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wyoming yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. WARREN. Certainly.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President, I want to challenge the statement made by the Senator from Wyoming that the General of the Army has recommended 100,000 men. He has recommended an Army of 76,000. That is what he has recommended, and it can not be found anywhere that he has recommended an Army of 100,000.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, I do not think the Senator and I differ at all about that, except on one point, and that is of what the regular standing army consists. The Senator insists that we are providing for a standing army of 100,000 men, which we propose to keep in time of peace as well as war. That I deny.

Now, I want to assert again that the General, or more properly the Lieutenant-General, of the Army has declared not only in favor of 100,000 or 98,000 men now, but he came to the committee later on and made a most eloquent plea for adding three more regiments of artillery, which would have carried it to about 101,000 instead



of 98,000, and he also desired the additional artillery to be a part of the permanent establishment.

Now, Mr. President, we not only have the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, the Lieutenant-General of the Army, and the Adjutant-General in favor of an army of this size, but we have all the staff officers; and I may say that with one or two exceptions all of the chiefs of staff have been before the Committee on Military Affairs asking that their staffs be broadened and enlarged and that each may have a greater force than the bill provides.

The Committee on Military Affairs has cut down as far as it considers possible with safety the number of the proposed Army, and to-day the bill appears here not as large as is recommended by those who have a right to know what is needed, and who are our agents and representatives intrusted with the conduct of the Army.

If a man in business had an enterprise located in a foreign place, and he selected his agents and put them in charge of that business and asked them to take plenty of time and report to him a plan of action, stating how many clerks, if you please, how much money for expense, if you please, were required, and a general plan for that business, what would he do when they came before him and presented their plans? Why, he would say, my agents selected for the business are entitled to greater credit than some neighbor of mine who never saw the business—who never spent a day in the industry or in thinking about it, and who doggedly says we do not need this or that employee or thing.

It seems to me when we have men in the Army drawn from the best in the land, men who can not possibly make or receive one penny more for themselves by the passage of this bill, who have no interests in the world except the interests of the country they serve, men who have grown gray in wars and against whom not one word has ever been said as to their honor, who come here and say upon their honor we need this and thus so, we can afford to take their judgment. It may be a matter of judgment only, upon which we can all differ, but I am willing to take their judgment—at least until some Senator who opposes the bill shall give some reason why we should not accept it.

We are told that the size the Army was before the Spanish war would be about right; and then some Senator gets enthusiastic about it and says we do not need any army, and practically claims that the millenium has arrived; that we are going to have a Utopian condition of affairs hereafter, and do not need any army.

Mr. President, if we need any army, then the question is open for debate as to the size of it. If I am wrong I hope somebody will correct me; but I have not yet heard a man on either side of the Chamber say that 100,000 men are too many for the present exigency.

Mr. TELLER. Nobody claims it.

Mr. WARREN. No; I thought not. So in this work now before us we are not providing any more men than we need to-day. On the other side of the Chamber they require that it shall be temporary, at the will of Congress only, and we on this side are willing that it shall be temporary as to the will of Congress just the same, but with the additional safety against too large an army that it can be reduced, and at the will of the President, in the meantime. Which is the better plan?

I maintain that there has been nothing offered here in the way of argument or amendment, or even suggestion, that makes it any better policy or makes our proposed forces any more an army of a temporary nature, so far as the number from 54,000 up is concerned, than does this very bill. It is not long since we had a law providing that 30,000 men should be the maximum of the Army. Congress was of an economical disposition, and so they appropriated for 25,000 men only, if I remember correctly, and the Army was thus reduced to 25,000 men. It is always an easy matter to reduce an army, but it is a hard matter sometimes to increase one.

Suppose the President should not take advantage as early as we think he should of this proposition of reduction, how long would it take, if Congress should refuse to appropriate for more than only what it thought fit, or if Congress should legislate directly for a smaller Army, to reduce it to that figure? How long will it take under the regular expirations of enlistment to reduce it?

The time of enlistment of soldiers in the Regular Army is expiring every day. It is the natural run of events for an army to decrease. Make your Army 100,000 to-day, and even to-morrow it is less, next month still less, next year it is very, very much less. We are now proposing, while we are at it, what we believe is the very least Army with which we can conduct the affairs of this nation, situated as we are at home and abroad.

This proposition of keeping the Army at 30,000 because it was once 30,000 is no more tenable than the proposition would be to put it at 10,000 because it was once 10,000. If I read the signs of the times correctly; if I read correctly the history of this country and its achievements, an army of 54,000 to-day is no more than an army

of 30,000 was when we had 30,000; and even an army of 100,000 now would be no more than an army of 10,000 in Jefferson's time—in fact, not so much.

Mr. President, I have heard no one deny that our former Army of 30,000 men was small enough, but when we had to do with that Army we had no coast defenses of consequence; we had a great portion of the Western country entirely wild and remote from everybody and every settlement; we had a territory from which many States have since been carved and are to-day represented on this floor which was then unoccupied and unguarded.

There were no troops there, no protection offered, and none attempted. We had only a part of our present frontier to provide for, a few tribes of Indians to look after, and the remainder we allowed to come and go as they pleased.

Since that time men have come here to Congress from States on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and asked for appropriations for coast defenses. We have appropriated millions upon millions of money for these works and for the armament and the ordnance that goes in them.

It has been stated by Senators on the other side that with those guns and works it was necessary to largely increase our military force simply to take care of the property. We must keep those expensive guns and machinery in condition. There is no question, and there has been no question raised here upon any side, but that the coast defenses require more than 18,000 men—the Secretary of War says 24,000—and when you have got the 18,000 or the 18,500 on duty in those defenses, what have you got?

You have simply got one relief, who, if under attack, could only work just long enough to exhaust themselves. They could stand a quick attack, but they could not keep up a war. They could not resist an enemy who was persistent and continuous in its attack. That would require a very much larger force.

We are only attempting, if you please, to put men enough—and that will be about eighteen or twenty thousand—in the coast defenses about which we are talking so as to have one man in a place; and if these men were sleepless and tireless, of course they could operate the guns and machinery of those great works in order and working; but if you have an attack upon them—and I take it you would not have built such works unless you did expect them at some time to be attacked—you have to rush men immediately to the point of attack and inside of twenty-four hours, or you have an exhausted force that can not maintain itself against a vigorous foe.

You must have a reserve force of artillerymen stationed at convenient points, easily moved to any one of those coast points in time of attack, if you would have a safe country, if you would have any value from your coast-defense works, upon which you have expended so much money in erection, if you would preserve the integrity of the nation.

It has been said somewhat flippantly by at least one Senator who happens to live near the coast that all we need for an army is the 18,000 or 20,000 artillery, with possibly a company or a part of a company at this post or that throughout the interior of the United States. This statement is made without warrant.

While we have been in deep trouble with Spain and the Philippines, we have been exceedingly fortunate upon our frontier; but trouble with the Indians upon the frontier nearly always comes like lightning from a clear sky. We do not know when to expect it or when it may come.

It is said by some who do not know that such danger is all over with and past. To say that the danger of our having any trouble with the Indians on the frontier has passed is nonsense and worse than nonsense. We who have been upon that frontier for thirty years or more know that the great losses of life and the great losses of property to which we have been subjected have occurred because the Army was not sufficient; and when an attack came, before the Army or any portion of it, except, perhaps, a part of some company at a post, could get there, the damage would be done.

Are you going to forsake all that frontier, and are you going to leave your posts throughout the country entirely uninhabited? I maintain that there is just as much necessity for troops along the Indian frontier as there has been at any time; not to fight, but to prevent fighting.

The Indian measures the strength of this Government by what he sees. If he sees near him a force sufficient to overcome any attack he may make, he makes no attack. Are you going to put the price of your property and the lives of your wives and children against the naked, thoughtless, unsupported statement that there is no longer a force needed on the frontier, and that the Indians are all good?

We have Alaska. When we secured possession of that country we heard much against its being taken over as our property, and we heard much about the folly and foolishness of throwing away money to buy it; and it was unconstitutional, it was said. Alaska—a country that has paid for itself over and over again, and promises to yield up more precious metals than any other part of the

country; and, for that matter, it is an astonishing country outside of its gold development. We must have a force there; we have a small one there now, but it is not sufficient.

You have your islands in the Pacific and your islands in the Atlantic; you have your foreign troubles, and you have your Nicaraguan Canal in prospect. I maintain that, so far as a regular standing Army is concerned, it means exactly what the bill says—54,000 men. That is the only meaning of it. So far as I know, it is the understanding of those who intend to vote for the bill that the standing Army of the United States shall be 54,000.

I want to say that 54,000 is as low as the Army ever ought to go. What kind of a country have we that we undertake to say we need little or nothing in the line of an army, and yet we are spending millions and hundreds of millions of dollars for war ships and for coast defenses?

It is said we need only an army the size of that which we needed twenty years ago. If that is true, why do we not use the same old wooden tubs as war vessels that we used twenty or thirty years ago? Why build a navy, and a magnificent one that is an honor to the country, one that my vote has always been recorded for in its completeness, notwithstanding the fact that I seldom see salt water or the seacoast? Why are you making large appropriations for the building up of a great navy for the country, and then denying it men and appropriations for its Army?

Mr. President, we are at this moment the wealthiest nation of the world, nearly 40 per cent wealthier than any other; we have more gold than any other nation in the world; we have more silver than any other nation in the world; we have a debt of only 2 per cent of the value of our property, and less than any but one other country (Germany); we are fourth in the world in wealth per capita.

We have one-tenth of the commerce of the world, and we are going to have more, I hope; we are the third in our exports and imports of the countries of the world; we are fifth in the carrying power of the world; we have more than two and one-fourth times as much money invested in railroads as any other country on earth; we have more than twice as much invested as any other country except Great Britain; and we carry our freight at only one-fourth to one-third of the price per ton per mile charged and collected by other countries.

Mr. TURLEY. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. WARREN. Certainly.

Mr. TURLEY. I have heard the Senator's eloquent description of all that we have accomplished in the way of commerce and wealth and the happy condition we are now in. I would ask the Senator if it is not true that we have accomplished all these great results with an Army of 25,000 men?

Mr. WARREN. No; it is not true.

Mr. TURLEY. For more than thirty years, for nearly half a century, we have had an Army of but 25,000 men; and if you will take the statistics they will show that all this great increase has come in that time.

Mr. WARREN. I will state to the Senator from Tennessee that if he will examine the statistics he will find there never was a time, in all those years, when the increase was ever so great as since we have had the Army we now have, of about 100,000 men. The statistics show that the great increase has come in the last two or three years, while we have had a great Army. But, perhaps, the size of the Army has had nothing to do with the matter.

Mr. TURLEY. I happen to have the statistics here, and, if the Senator will allow me, I will state that those statistics come down to 1899. I have analyzed them from 1870 to 1899 as to our foreign commerce. I have not carried the figuring further. The statistics show that the increase in our foreign commerce, mainly in exports, from 1870 to 1899, was \$1,095,441,615, and it has increased regularly. I have analyzed it by ten-year periods.

From 1870 to 1880 we increased \$674,000,000; from 1880 to 1890 we increased \$143,000,000—those are in round numbers; from 1890 to 1899 we increased about \$370,000,000.

Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator give us the figures by years and not by decades?

Mr. TURLEY. The average increase in some years is greater than in others. Sometimes the exports and imports would fall one a little below the other, but there has been a gradual and constant increase during this period, now of thirty years, that I worked out here; and it is during that period that we have acquired our great commercial prominence and the condition which was so eloquently described by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] the other day.

Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator be kind enough to give us the increases in 1897, 1898, and 1899, as compared with the previous three or four years?

Mr. TURLEY. They were very wonderful and large increases, but we had no such army in 1897 or in 1898 as is now proposed.

Mr. CLARK. I will confine my question to 1898 and 1899. Will the Senator give us the increases in those years?

Mr. TURLEY. I can state that in 1898 and 1899 the increase was with nations with which we were at peace, and there is not one dollar of that increase which can be attributed to the enlistment of a single soldier.

Mr. CLARK. Simply a coincidence.

Mr. TURLEY. It is no coincidence. It is the regular result of a condition of affairs which has existed for thirty years, and one secret of it is that we have been free from the burden of taxation that a large standing army entails.

Mr. WARREN. I will relieve the mind of the Senator from Tennessee by saying that my remarks were not directed to prove that a larger army caused this increase. I do not intend to drift into what the Senator would term commercialism and against which he is hedging. I was simply stating the present condition of this country, preparatory to my making some other comparisons.

Mr. TURLEY. I should like to ask the Senator to allow me to state one other thing in connection with this matter, if I am not trespassing on his time, and then he can reply to it if he so desires.

Mr. WARREN. Very well.

Mr. TURLEY. Take the statistics of this foreign commerce and compare it with the cost of this increased Army, which is claimed to be necessary in order to hold the Eastern islands which we are seeking to acquire dominion over in order to secure additional markets for our trade.

The annual increase for these thirty years in our foreign commerce was about thirty-six or thirty-seven million dollars, if you take it by these periods, and the yearly increase in the cost of the Army, which it is said is necessary to maintain our commercial supremacy with the world, is over \$120,000,000 for the Army alone. In other words, under this policy we are expending four times as much in order to maintain this commercial supremacy as the increase in the supremacy has been year by year, and so it will continue.

Mr. WARREN. I still think the Senator is shooting at something that I have not set up as a mark. My statements were in another direction, and I will finish what I was about to say.

We were considering the condition of our country to-day as compared with that of other countries. I spoke of railroads. We have two and one-fourth times as much invested in railroads as any other country in the world.

I spoke of our carrying trade for from a quarter to one-half per mile per ton less than that of any other nation. I want to add to that that we are producing more than one and one-half times the amount of grain and breadstuffs produced by any other country in the world; we are producing more than twice the meat products of any other country in the world; we are producing more coal than any other country; we are producing as much cotton as all the world besides, and we are producing more wool than any other country in the world, excepting Australia and the River Plate country. So that in all that goes to make a country independent and great we certainly stand at the head. We have our meat and bread, the two greatest food products of the world, standing far above any other country in quantity and quality, and we have our cotton and our wool for clothing.

Now we come to our manufactures. We find that we have one and one-half times as much iron, twice as much steel, and one and one-half times as much manufactured hardware as that of any other nation in the world. We find in textile manufactures we exceed all countries in the world but one—Great Britain.

After making this statement, which can not be refuted, can it be said, will it be said, that we can not support an army which is but a toy army in size compared with the armies of other nations? We have a longer line of seacoast than that of almost any other nation—and perhaps I can say than any nation; we have to admit that we have accepted responsibilities far away from the mainland; and we have acquired territory that we propose to hold and protect.

We have the Philippines. What may be the outcome there we do not know, but we all agree upon the fact that we are going to have and to hold army enough there to solve the problem. We have Hawaii, we have Guam, we have interests in Samoa, we have Porto Rico—and we are going to hold them.

Now, Mr. President, where do we stand, comparatively, with other nations as to the Army? I have shown that we are infinitely greater in all that produces and sustains an army. Now, what comparison have we to make with other countries in respect to standing armies? Take the principal nations.

If we should keep an army of 100,000 men, mind you—if we should remain on a war footing—we would then be but the twelfth, compared with the other nations of the world when they are on a peace footing. We, on war footing, only twelfth to other countries on peace footing; and we would stand at the very bottom of the list of twenty nations if we put our Army on a peace footing against their armies on a peace footing.



I submit a table showing this:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, August 28, 1900.

According to the latest available sources, which are considered fairly reliable, the peace and war strength of the armies of the nations mentioned below is stated to be as follows:

Nation.	Peace strength.		War strength.
	Officers.	Men.	
Austria-Hungary, 1899	26,454	335,239	1,872,178
Belgium, 1899	3,472	48,030	163,000
Brazil, 1897	2,300	25,860	—
China	—	300,000	1,000,000
France, 1900	29,740	586,735	2,500,000
Germany, 1899	23,230	562,266	3,000,000
Great Britain, 1900	11,904	247,237	503,484
Italy, 1898	14,084	310,602	1,304,854
Japan, 1898	6,356	115,673	407,963
Mexico, 1898	2,068	30,075	151,500
Persia	24,500	24,500	105,500
Portugal, 1899	1,804	30,000	157,126
Roumania	3,280	60,000	171,948
Russia, 1900	36,000	860,000	3,500,000
Servia, 1897	—	160,751	353,366
Spain, 1899	—	98,140	183,972
Sweden, 1899	—	2,513	37,639
Switzerland, 1899	—	—	509,707
Turkey, 1898	—	700,620	900,000
United States, 1900	2,587	65,000	100,000

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.

<sup>2</sup> Available men liable to military service.

<sup>3</sup> Estimated on present organization to have over 3,000,000 trained men. War strength not given.

<sup>4</sup> Of this number 74,288 are Indian troops.

<sup>5</sup> In addition there are maintained in the colonies 9,478 officers and men.

<sup>6</sup> Approximately.

<sup>7</sup> No standing army.

Now, suppose we take the proportion of population to standing army and compare ourselves with other noted countries which have made great successes. In the proposed Army bill our peace footing as to our population would be a little less than three-quarters of one soldier to a thousand persons. This is less than one-sixth that of any other first-class nation; in fact, it is less than one-sixth of any of the 20 nations which stand the highest commercially.

So far as other countries are concerned, take, if you please, those which have scored the greatest successes next to our own, and Great Britain has 10 soldiers to our 1, compared with population, and we stand with France in the relation of 1 to 25.

I submit a table showing these comparisons:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, December 8, 1900.

Peace strength of the armies, population, and percentage of former to latter of the principal countries of the world. This table is not strictly accurate at the present time, because the dates of censuses vary. In preparing this table the latest published census has been taken for population, and the countries are arranged in order of their percentages:

Nation.	Peace strength.	Population.	Percentage.
France	616,475	38,517,975	1.6
Norway	30,900	2,000,917	1.54
Germany	585,896	52,279,901	1.1
Roumania	63,280	5,800,000	1.1
Italy	324,686	31,856,675	1
Greece	25,333	2,433,806	1
Servia	22,448	2,312,484	.97
Austria-Hungary	361,693	41,357,184	0.87
Sweden	40,152	5,062,918	.79
Belgium	51,502	6,669,732	.77
Russia	896,000	128,932,173	.69
Great Britain and Ireland	259,141	38,104,975	.68
Turkey	244,000	38,791,000	.63
Portugal	31,804	5,049,729	.62
Spain	98,140	17,565,632	.56
Netherlands	27,696	5,074,632	.54
Denmark	9,769	2,185,335	.45
Japan	122,029	43,745,353	.30
Mexico	32,143	12,630,863	.25
Brazil	28,160	14,333,915	.19
United States	67,587	76,295,220	.089
Switzerland *	—	3,119,635	—

\* Switzerland has no standing army, but every citizen has to bear arms. The first class (elite), composed of men between the ages of 20 and 32, has from forty to eighty days' training the first year, and every second year thereafter sixteen days. About 18,000 men join the elite annually.

The Senator from Colorado [Mr. TELLER] said that this is a Republican measure. Mr. President, we have had a great many Republican measures of which I have been proud. The Army bill is a national business measure and not a partisan measure. We had a measure not many years since, however, that was not a Republican measure—a measure that was handled in this body by my friend, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. JONES], who, as I remember it, had charge of it—in regard to the tariff. He may indorse that measure; he may still maintain that it was a good measure; he may stand up here and say that it was a Democratic measure.

I am glad to say, emphatically, it was a Democratic measure. That was the Wilson-Gorman bill. Is that Senator or his party proud of that measure? The country at large is not proud of it. I am glad to say that since that time another, a tariff measure, has been passed which can properly be called a Republican measure.

I want to say that I am glad that measure did pass, and I want to say, furthermore, that a great portion of the success of the country of which I have been speaking came after the change and after that other measure was passed; and there never has been a time in the history of this country, under any kind of a tariff bill, when we were doing better than we are now, notwithstanding we need an Army of 54,000 men, or about three-quarters of a man to a thousand of our population.

Mr. President, making my acknowledgments to the Senator from Colorado for his most kindly reference to myself as a volunteer soldier, I wish to say that it is as a volunteer soldier and because of my experience in the ranks as a volunteer soldier that I stand here and insist that we need a standing army for this nation, and that we need not less than 54,000 men. I wish it were a little more than that.

It is said that a little leaven leaveneth the whole loaf, but you must have a little leaven. If you are going to have a volunteer army, you must have at least a nucleus of men able to instruct that volunteer army so that it may meet with success as a volunteer army. It is necessary that volunteers should have the benefit of the teachings of those who are educated in war, or they must get it by experience in time of war and be unprepared in the meantime.

It seems to me that if we make an army of 100,000 men, about one-half of it temporary, and reduce it along as the terms of enlistments come to an end, we shall all the time have an army that is made up of men who are under training for service.

Take the volunteer force, Mr. President. They volunteer to fight, and the kind of an army which has been alluded to here, and alluded to in complimentary terms, as it should be, is an army that enlists for war and not for peace; the men enlist because they want an opportunity to fight the battles of their country. They do not enlist to stand guard duty; they do not enlist to go into our earthworks, if you please, or our fortifications. They are a different class of men.

Most of the volunteers who enlist when war is on will do their duty, of course, but they lose interest just as soon as they have to take to the shovel instead of the bayonet; they lose interest just as soon as they have to stand guard, instead of being out where they can have a brush occasionally with the enemy.

The warfare that we now have on in the Philippines is of a peculiar nature. It is devoid of the excitement of the rush of battle which occurs in our great crises. We now want guards, sentinels, and pickets for the Philippines. We have 400 or more temporary posts located there.

We want to put a handful of men here and a handful of men there, and they are really doing little but guard duty. To do that duty well you want men who are enlisted in the Regular Army, who understand what they are to do and will do it as a part of the duty for which they enlisted.

It seems to me, as a business proposition, we ought to pass this bill soon. That is unquestioned. We should build an army that is symmetrical, and in building this army it is most symmetrical at 50,000. It is heavy and unsymmetrical if you hold it at a hundred thousand, because the officers which you have are only sufficient to properly handle 54,000 men, and that is the best evidence of the good faith of the measure, that you are providing officers for only 54,000 men.

If you are to have volunteers, you must have your young men educated at home in their States in the militia and at schools and colleges. You should have men who have passed Westpoint and who have become thoroughly educated in the arts of war, and who are thoroughly familiar and are thorough teachers at every school where you have the youth of America, if you propose to keep up your standard of the volunteer soldier. Reduce it to 54,000, take the men who are necessary, and who have always been considered necessary for that use, and you can barely get along, under proper discipline, with 54,000.

Mr. President, I am not going to tire myself or the Senate with any extended remarks, but I wish to say again that I repel the assertion as untrue in every particular, that it is the intention of those who are presenting the pending bill on this floor to deceive the public and to hold the Army at 100,000 men in times of peace. Mr. President, war is grim-visaged and terrible in any event, but war, though always dreaded but sometimes necessary, is a business, and much more so is the preparation for war; and if the Government would have best results and economical cost, we must handle war and war preparations upon business principles.

This can not be done with temporary makeshift legislation. It is unsatisfactory alike to enlisted men and officers. The American people, in time of difference with a foreign foe, can, by appeals to patriotism, be enlisted rapidly and from the best material, and

they will fight valiantly and do good execution even if not fully drilled and disciplined.

But war sometimes comes unexpectedly and suddenly, and we are compelled to order men into the field with very little preparation. Hence let us at least have enough in our standing Army to insure us a fair number of instructors and guides with which to at least mold into shape the new and raw material for a larger army in case of trouble from within or without, or, better yet, to create an army so formidable that its strength will serve to prevent trouble.

Mr. FORAKER. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

Mr. ALLISON. I ask the Senator from Ohio to withdraw the motion for a moment.

Mr. FORAKER. Certainly.

Mr. ALLISON. I think we have reached a stage in the business of the session where we ought, at least until the Army bill is completed, meet at 11 o'clock. I hope that, by unanimous consent, when we adjourn to-day we will adjourn until 11 o'clock to-morrow. I ask that that may be done.

Mr. JONES of Arkansas. I do not want to interfere with whatever course the majority may take in the matter of the hours of meeting and adjourning, but I wish to suggest to the Senator from Iowa that there are reasons why that practice should not be entered on now. One committee I know of, the Committee on Indian Affairs, is busy with the preparation of an appropriation bill, and for the Senate to meet at 11 o'clock will make it very difficult for due consideration to be given to the preparation of that bill. I am satisfied its passage through the Senate will be facilitated very much by having time enough carefully to perfect the bill. The committee is to meet to-morrow morning. The notices are already out for half past 10 o'clock.

Mr. ALLISON. Then I will modify my request by asking unanimous consent that after to-morrow, unless this bill shall be completed to-morrow, the Senate shall meet at 11 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LODGE in the chair). The Senator from Iowa asks unanimous consent that, if the pending bill is not completed to-morrow, after to-morrow the Senate shall meet at 11 o'clock. Is there objection?

Mr. PETTIGREW. I do not desire to object, but I do not think we had better establish that rule now. So far as I am concerned, if we do not come to an understanding to-morrow for a vote next day, I shall be perfectly willing that on the next day we shall meet at 11 o'clock, and I shall offer no objection; but I do not like to make the arrangement now.

Mr. ALLISON. I only intended the request to apply to the Army bill, and I will withdraw it at the suggestion of the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. PETTIGREW. I think we can now come to a vote on this bill very soon.

Mr. ALLISON. I withdraw the request at the suggestion of the Senator from South Dakota.

#### EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. FORAKER. I renew my motion that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After fifteen minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 5 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, January 16, 1901, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### CONFIRMATIONS.

*Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate January 15, 1901.*

ASSISTANT REGISTER OF THE TREASURY.

Cyrus F. Adams, of Illinois, to be Assistant Register of the Treasury.

DEPUTY AUDITOR FOR THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

Nolen L. Chew, of Indiana, to be Deputy Auditor for the Post-Office Department.

#### HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

TUESDAY, January 15, 1901.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon. Prayer was offered by the Chaplain, Rev. H. N. COUDEN, D. D.

The Journal of yesterday's proceedings was read and approved.

INAUGURATION EXPENSES MARCH 4, 1901.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am directed by the Committee on Appropriations to report back Senate joint resolution 142 with an amendment, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, reports back with amendment joint resolution 142, and asks for immediate consideration thereof. The Clerk will report the resolution.

The Clerk read as follows:

Joint resolution to enable the Secretary of the Senate to pay the necessary expenses of the inaugural ceremonies of the President and Vice-President of the United States, March 4, 1901.

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That to enable the Secretary of the Senate to pay the necessary expenses of the inaugural ceremonies of the President and Vice-President of the United States, March 4, 1901, in accordance with the programme adopted by the committee of arrangements appointed under resolution of the Senate of the 11th day of December, 1900, including the pay for extra police for three days, at \$3 per day, there is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, \$5,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, the same to be immediately available.

With the following amendment recommended by the committee:

In line 12, strike out the word "five" and insert "seven."

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I want to ask the gentleman if this is the usual resolution, or is it more than has been formerly appropriated on such occasions.

Mr. BINGHAM. It is a joint resolution of the Senate referred to the Committee on Appropriations and reported back by the committee with an amendment increasing the amount from \$5,000 to \$7,000, and if the gentleman from Tennessee wishes I will make an explanation.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Is it not rather unusual for the House to raise the amount of an appropriation bill from the Senate? I thought the opposite was the usual course. [Laughter.]

Mr. BINGHAM. This is an expenditure of money that does not come from the contingent fund, but is a fixed appropriation, and from which the House receives special and direct benefit.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. I asked the gentleman if it is not unusual for the House to raise an appropriation from that fixed by the Senate?

Mr. BINGHAM. We do raise it \$2,000.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Does the gentleman think it is necessary to make that increase?

Mr. BINGHAM. I will submit to the gentleman. The resolution of the Senate is identical with the resolution four years ago whereby a center platform was erected that had accommodations for 3,000 seated guests. It is the intention, after conference with the Sergeant-at-Arms of the two Houses, to make an expansion of the seating capacity so that each flank from the center platform will be seats for 2,100 guests of the Senate and 2,100 guests of the House, for which tickets will be issued by the Sergeants-at-Arms of the respective Houses. There has been serious complaint heretofore that sufficient convenience has not been given to the guests of the members of the two Houses. This, it is believed, will obviate that criticism so that the seating capacity will be a little in excess of 7,000 guests, or seats.

The committee, upon inquiry, found that the building of this platform would be let to the lowest responsible bidder, that the seats in distribution would be in control of the two Houses, of the respective Sergeant-at-Arms.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Will be in control of whom? I could not hear the gentleman.

Mr. BINGHAM. The seats on the House flank will be under the control of the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Where are they to be located?

Mr. BINGHAM. Immediately on the flank of the center platform, the entrance on the outside, the parties receiving the tickets to enter from the outside and go to their seats. The Senate seats will be on the other flank and will enter from the Senate side of the platform. Those who go on the center platform will be such parties as have the right to the entrance to the Capitol by ticket, as heretofore, two tickets for each member of the House, as heretofore, four tickets to each member of the Senate. The Cabinet and the Supreme Court, the members of the next Congress, Senators, Representatives, the foreign legations, all the employees of the House who are within the limits of its walls, will have the right to go upon the center platform, but the distinct right of the flank platforms, covering 2,100 feet for each Chamber, will be within the absolute control of the Sergeants-at-Arms of the respective Houses. This, it is assumed, will give to each member six additional seats.

Mr. GROSVENOR. I would like to ask the gentleman if it would be an unfair advantage to give the 357 members of the House as many tickets as the eighty-odd members of the Senate have?

Mr. BINGHAM. This arrangement has been the rule heretofore adopted, and the committee did not feel that it should vary it. I will state that in the sum total, when you come to multiply 357 by 2, and when every member has the right to enter without a ticket, and members of the next Congress without a ticket, it will be found that it is a fair distribution of the seats.

Mr. GROSVENOR. How many additional tickets will this arrangement give to each Senator?

Mr. BINGHAM. That is a Senatorial courtesy we did not make any infringement upon.

Mr. DALZELL. Mr. Speaker, I want to call the attention of my colleague from Pennsylvania to the fact that in the joint resolution which he presents there is no recognition of the House in